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Abstract
Otherwise, the Gap: Performing Identities in Iranian Contemporary Art and
Performance explores the intersections between race, performance, and politics within
and without the so-called Middle Eastern region. I use theories of race, gender, per-
formance, and ritual to investigate the performativity of what I call strategic acts of
repair in the context of four case studies: Shadi Ghadirian’s Like EveryDay photo
collection; 84Theatre Company’s productions of Endless Monologue and Mountain
Language; and the underground Iranian instrumental and electronic music movement.
Through the framework of strategic acts of repair, I intend to theorize the performativ-
ity of constant attempts made by Iranian artist-activists in raising awareness as well as
facilitating a platform for addressing the political violence imposed on Iranian identity
on its legal top-down and everyday bottom-up level, domestically and internationally.
I argue these artworks from theatre, performance, visual and sonic art are vital sites
capable of articulating and resisting the exclusion that Muslims encounter in the Mid-
dle East as well as the United States of America. By interrogating these artworks
produced in the spaces of the theatre, Internet, and underground performance venues
in the Muslim diaspora, I am able to analyze scenographic, performative, and archi-
tectural strategies used by contemporary artists to build new artistic vocabularies of
resistance. I argue that these artists and their works orchestrate interactions between
the oppositional fronts, e.g., official and unofficial sectors, and provide spaces where
people can better understand and interpret their collective and individualistic identities
within and beyond the Middle Eastern official narrative.
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There exist two kinds of histories in Iran: an official history and an unofficial one. While
the official history is produced, practiced, and valued by governmental agencies, the unofficial
history is recorded and preserved by people who, in the eyes of the hegemonic regime, do not
officially exist. Throughout the past thirty-two years of the Islamic Republic reign over Iran, the
unofficial history has come full circle from considering “the official narrative” as a repressive
agent to viewing it as an indispensable part of its existence. These two histories—one constructed
by the government and the alternate lived by the people—are intertwined, with the legitimacy of
one dependent on the other. Despite such dysfunctional co-dependence, especially after the 2009
presidential election, a gap between these two histories was created: a gap where artists are using
stages, screens, and the worldwide web to challenge both historical narratives.i
“Otherwise, the Gap: Performing Identities in Iranian Contemporary Art and Performance”
investigates this gap within and outside Iran—a gap that is neither official nor unofficial but rather
a mix of both. To use Performance Studies scholar Richard Schechner’s rhetoric, this gap is not
official/unofficial and not not official/unofficial but something in between.ii As an Iranian artist
scholar working in the diaspora, I study this gap as an intersection where alternate Iranian identities
are shaped and practiced. Moreover, this gap is in direct conversation with how Iranianness is
constructed and stereotyped not only through the Islamic rhetoric of Iran’s clerical regime but
iOn 12 June 2009 Ahmadinejad was re-elected as the seventh president of Iran. The controversy around the elec-
tion made people to go to the streets and request the recount. Due to the clamped down, people’s protests turned into
violent street battles. As a reaction, artists started to create spaces capable of criticizing and condemning Ahmadinejad
and his power structure through visual and performing art.
iiFor further reading please refer to Richard Schechner’s book, Between Theatre and Anthropology, University of
Pennsylvania Press, p. 123.
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also through the supposedly democratic and secularist power structures of the Western world.
This gap speaks to the exclusion that progressive Iranian artists and activists encounter inside and
outside the country: Inside Iran, advocates of reforming and modernizing Islam are suppressed,
detained, and exiled under the justification of being “westoxicated”iii; outside the country, they
are marginalized in the context of the black/white racial binary. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks
and President George W. Bush’s State of the Union address calling Iran, Iraq, and North Korea
an “axis of evil,” it became obvious that Iranians, as well as Arabs, regardless of their political
and ideological standpoints, were going to be categorized as national threats and radical Islamists
in the United States. Therefore, this gap that I investigate is situated at the intersection of such
stereotyping and essentialism; while this gap challenges Iran’s regime for its sometimes intolerance
toward internal change, it reacts to the racial policies that target Iranians as immigrants of color
and radical Muslims and that thus justify their marginalization.
Within this gap, I identify artworks from theatre, visual art, and electronic music as sites
capable of articulating and resisting the exclusion that Iranians encounter within and without the
country. The artists of these art forms, by putting everything on the line, sacrifice their freedom to
problematize the shortcomings associated with the essentialist rhetoric of the hegemonic powers.
This interdisciplinary and intertextual dissertation takes for its objects of study works produced in
the spaces of the Internet, in underground venues, and throughout the Iranian diaspora to analyze
the scenographic, performative, and architectural strategies that are used to build new artistic vo-
cabularies of resistance. I ask how do these artists and their works orchestrate interactions between
the oppositional fronts while creating spaces where people can better understand and interpret
their collective and individualistic identities inside and outside official narratives? Also, how can
iiiThe push to modernize and westernize the cultural hegemony in Iran started during Reza Shah Pahlavi, who
became ruler of Iran in 1941. However, this push was so sudden that it caused a backlash among a group of Iranian
intellectuals including Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Daryush Shayegan, and Reza Davari. By labeling the West as the ‘Other,’
these intellectuals believed such a process of westernizing the country was to put an end to the authentic Iranian culture
and its political and economical sovereignty in the Middle East. By calling those in favor of the change “westoxicated,”
they encouraged Iranian people and elites to preserve their cultural identity. From early 1960s onwards, the ideas and
theories of this group of elites dominated the Iranian outlook towards the West. The gap created between period of
westernization of the country followed by a strong anti-western ideology of Islamic Republic regime radically affected
the ways Iranian identity got perceived and practiced not only by Iranian themselves but also by the “others.”
2
we better understand the intertextual and interdisciplinary role that progressive artworks play in
shaping what I call the gap, or the liminal space between essentialist official narratives of Irani-
anness and alternative counter representations? How do the selected artists maintain a dialogue
between oppositional fronts and in the lived, visual, and sonic representations of Iranianness both
in Iran and in the diaspora? I use theories of race, gender, performance, and ritual to investigate
the performativity of what I call strategic acts of repair in the context of four case studies: Shadi
Ghadirian’s Like EveryDay photo collection; 84Theatre Company’s productions of Endless Mono-
logue and Mountain Language; and the underground Iranian instrumental and electronic music
movement.
Subjects of Study: Forbidden Identities in the Gap
The first case study that this dissertation investigates is Like EveryDay by Shadi Ghadirian. As one
of the most progressive female photographers of the late 20th and 21st century in Iran, Ghadirian
was born in Tehran during the Islamic revolution. Experiencing the tumultuous transition of power
from Pahlavi’s monarchy to the clerical regime, followed by the (imposed) war with Iraq,iv led
Ghadirian to focus solely on the role that Iranian women were limited to playing within the Islamic
and patriarchal cultural hegemony of the country.v Her most notable collections are Qajar (1998),
Like EveryDay (2001–2002), White Square (2009), and West by East (2004).
ivIn 1979 after two years of continuous protests and street battles, Iranian people, under the charismatic leadership
of Ayatollah Khomeini, overthrew the Pahlavi’s monarchy and established a republic regime centered on Islamic
ideology and clerical authority. Following the revolution and in order to show the new regime’s independence from the
West, on November 4, 1979, Basij (military force) invaded the US embassy and took sixty-five American diplomats as
hostage for 444 days. Following the invasion, the United States closed its embassy in Tehran and ended its diplomatic
relationship with the clerical regime. Parallel to the deterioration of Iran’s relationship with the West, in September
1980, the imposed war on Iran by the Western supported and equipped Iraqi army started. As Melani McAlister, in
Staging the American Century, Race, Gender, and Nation in the U.S Representation of the Middle East, 1945 – 1992,
argues, US provided “military and logistical support for Iraq” during the war. The Iran-Iraq war continued for eight
years during which significant damages were done to the country, especially to the Southern cities. Against all the
odds, Iran, through the countless sacrificial acts of its soldiers, won the war in 1988. Also, Samih K. Farsoun and
Mehrdad Mashayekhi, in preface to Iran Political Culture in the Islamic Republic, have talked about this imposed war
too.
vIran’s cultural discourse is a mixture of Islamic rules promoted by the power structure and traditional values
practiced and memorialized by the masses. In both cases, patriarchy is valued as a normative way of hierarchization.
3
Like EveryDay depicts women who are completely veiled in chadorvi with a domestic ob-
ject such as an iron, a pan, a cup, or a large knife in place of their faces. Ghadirian created this
collection after her marriage to Peyman Hooshmanzadeh,vii a notable Iranian writer and photogra-
pher, to criticize women’s position within the cultural hegemony of Iran. Banned from displaying
this series inside Iran, she featured it in a gallery in London; this provided her with international
recognition.
Figure 1.1: Shadi Ghadirian, Like EveryDay #1, 2000-1, 50x50 Cm, Artist’s Website
The second case study is a performance piece titled Endless Monologue, produced by Ali
Akbar Alizad, the founder of 84Theatre Company,viii who was born in Tehran in 1973, five years
before the Islamic revolution. After receiving his bachelor’s degree in acting and master’s degree
in cinematic studies, he started his career as the co-director of the Aeein and Leev theater groups
viChador is a large one-piece of cloth that Muslim women wear to cover their hair and bodies with only letting
their faces to be seen. The signature color for chador is black, however, white or blue navy are common colors among
elderly women.
viiFor more information please refer to http://www.asymptotejournal.com/visual/peyman-
hooshmandzadeh-memories/
viiiAlizad found 84Theatre Company in 2006 in Tehran with the goal of staging works written by famous playwrights
such as Beckett, Chekov, Sara Kane and Harold Pinter. The group is mostly comprised of Alizad’s past and current
students from the Art University of Tehran where he teaches acting and playwriting. For more information please refer
to http://84theater.com
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in Tehran.ix As a practitioner and scholar, Alizad is known for his ongoing experimentation with
methods of directing and actor training. After forming his own company, Alizad started to stage
works capable of articulating the problems associated with Iran’s political structure. Some of the
past performances by the group include productions such as Waiting for Godot by Samuel Beck-
ett (2004), Oleanna by David Mamet (2006), Anniversary Celebration and Swan Song by Anton
Chekhov (2007), Five Fragments by Samuel Beckett (2008), Endless Monologue by 84Theatre
Company (2011), House of Bernarda Alba by Federico García Lorca (2014) and Mountain Lan-
guage by Harold Pinter (2016). Despite these works being written by Western playwrights and re-
inforcing binary oppositions such as Occident/Orient and civility/barbarity, in the context of Iran’s
political discourse, these plays assisted Alizad in criticizing some of the cultural and political is-
sues caused by Ahmadinejad’s domestic and foreign policies and the Western World’s, especially
the United States’, harsh response to them.
Endless Monologue was a performance piece that Alizad produced upon his return from Lon-
don, where he witnessed a very powerful verbatim performance piece.x Considering verbatim
theater as a politically charged theatrical form for criticizing the sociopolitical issues of Iran, Al-
izad started interviewing people whose stories he believed needed to be (re)told and documented.
Among six interviews, Alizad selected three that were capable of articulating the exclusionary
rhetoric that Iranians encountered inside and outside the country. However, to protect the intervie-
wees’ safety, their identities were never disclosed during the course of the performance. The first
interview was with Hamid, a homosexual doctoral student who talked about his experience living
as a gay person in Iran and its highly heterosexual and traditional culture. His story was a detailed
description of his rape in the outskirts of Tehran by four men and his coping mechanism afterward.
The second interview was with Setareh, whose father was executed under the accusation of being
a political activist.xi The third and final interview narrated the story of Vida, who, with the hope of
ixBoth Aeein and Leev theatre groups formed in Tehran in the late 1990s with the goal of focusing on the role of
the audience as an active rather than passive member of a theatrical production. In order to avoid surveillance and
censorship, both of these groups rejected governmental funding and were self-funded.
xVerbatim theatre is a docudrama where true stories and interviews become the subject of the piece that form the
text.
xiThe identity of her father was never disclosed for the sake of Setareh’s and her family’s safety.
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finding independence and resisting her father’s autocracy, went through a series of traumatic expe-
riences such as abortion and a failed attempt to flee the country. All three interviews capitalized on
the flaws associated with Iran’s cultural discourse. Through staging this performance, Alizad also
intended to subvert the West’s insistence on projecting a barbaric and homophobic attitude on all
Iranians.
To criticize the judicial and militarized political violence imposed on Iranians within and
without Middle Eastern region, Alizad chose Mountain Language, written by Harold Pinter, as his
next project. Pinter wrote this play in 1988 as a critique of Turkey’s oppressive policies toward
the Kurdish population. Alizad, by capitalizing on Pinter’s critique and incorporating the torture
scenes in Mountain Language, presented a chilling demonstration of the condition of tortured
brown bodies trapped in jails.
The final case study that I explore is the underground electronic music movement in Iran
developed during the first term of Ahmadinejad’s presidency and was subsequently internationally
recognized after his reelection in 2009. By challenging what is counted as “permissible” music,
this movement not only sought to subvert governmental censorship but also tended to build a
more inclusive sonic space where imagining different individual and collective identities becomes
possible. Rejected by domestic labels, the electronic musicians were courted by international labels
who showed interest in producing their works. Within the chapter I argue while the nontraditional
form of the electronic music movement in Iran promotes and mobilizes the emancipatory hopes for
reconfiguring Iran’s cultural domain, its appeal to the Western world can be endemic in reification
of old bifurcations such as Orient/Occident.xii
xiiFor Further reading please refer to Orientalism, written by Edward Said in 1979.
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Figure 1.2: Day 3 of Set Festival 2015, Idlefon performing with Nyla, Tehran, Iran, 2015. Photo by A Minor Music
Methodologically, “Otherwise, the Gap: Performing Identities in Iranian Contemporary Art
and Performance” utilizes archival research as well as analysis of live and recorded performances,
photographs and music video. By adapting theories of race, gender, performance, and ritual, this
project theorizes the performativity of its case studies in relation to (re)formation of the Iranian
identity within and without the Middle Eastern region. Race and gender theory, especially those
formulated by Michael Omi, Howard Winant, and Daniel Martinez Hosang, is incorporated in this
project as a way of thinking critically about the lack of available discourse to discuss the racial
formation of so-called Middle Eastern subjects within the region as well as within the U.S. black-
/white racial binary. Performance theories allow this project to explore the performativity of these
artworks in the context of their domestic and international political and cultural discourses. Ritual
theories are applied as a way of reframing the strategies employed by Iranian artists to subvert the




The main theories that I incorporate to talk about race and gender in the context of my case
studies are derived from the following works: Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s Racial Forma-
tion in the United States, Daniel Martinez Hosang’s Racial Formation in the Twenty-First Century,
Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi’s Iran: Political Culture in the Islamic Republic, and
Pamela Karimi’s Domesticity and Consumer Culture in Iran: Interior Revolutions of the Mod-
ern Era. Because the discourse on the racialization of Islamic subjects is limited and often uses
Western historical contexts, I supplement U.S. based racial formation theories attempting to chal-
lenge hegemonic norms and racial projects with works by Iranian Studies scholars who address the
vacillation of Iranianness in the United States’ racial imaginary.
In their groundbreaking book Racial Formation in the United States, Omi and Winant state,
There is a continuous temptation to think of race as an essence, as something fixed,
concrete, and objective. And there is also an opposite temptation: to imagine race as a
mere illusion, a purely ideological construct which some ideal non-racist social order
would eliminate.1
To overcome such essentialism, they propose the idea of understanding race as an “unstable” and
“decentered” social structure subjected to constant change and rearticulation. As they contend,
“race is a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interest by referring to
different types of human bodies.”2 Since the Islamic revolution, Iranians have been represented
domestically and internationally in complex and contradictory ways. Domestically, following the
revolution, those who fostered the idea of Islamic reign and facilitated the necessary platform
for overturning the Pahlavi regime were excluded from the power structure through either exile
or house arrest. While the marginalization of oppositional voices was pursued under accusations
such as westoxication or the advocacy of Western democracy and secularism, after the 9/11 terror-
ist attacks, Iranians were harassed internationally as well. The Western countries, despite declaring
their interest in cultural pluralism, constantly singled out and represented Islam as a problematic
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and dangerous religion. Such troubling assumptions and reductionism were projected on all Ira-
nians and Arabs and used as an advantageous strategy for the Western countries who found them-
selves in need of preserving their supremacy over the Middle East and its oil resources. This is
where Omi and Winant’s argument falls short and Hosang’s Racial Formation in the Twenty-First
Century intervenes. As Hosang suggests, Omi and Winant left a number of questions unanswered:
How is the gendered and sexual basis of racial formation most productively theorized?
How do theories about the biological basis of race continue to shape assumptions
about the social and political construction of race? How might racial formation theory
effectively engage issues of indigeneity, war making, and settler colonialism? Racial
Formation in the Twenty-First Century explores these and other questions, building on
twenty-five years of scholarship since Omi and Winant’s generative insights first came
to light.3
While contributors to Racial Formation in the Twenty-First Century embrace Omi and Winant’s
definition of race (a centerpiece of all social and political structures in the United States), by posing
critical questions, they explore the limitations of such a definition.
Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi, in Iran: Political Culture in the Islamic Re-
public, provide a rich and comprehensive study of the genealogy of the Islamic ideology among
Iranians. Their study starts with an investigation of the sociopolitical and economic policies of the
Shah’s regime and the cause of their failure. An attempt for the secularization and modernization
of the country was the centerpiece of the Shah’s reformative project. However, as Farsoun and
Mashayekhi argue,
The progress of secularization was most evident in state institutions, it failed to en-
compass the political culture of the society at large or advance the institutions of civil
society. As a result Iranian political culture during the period of the monarchy re-
mained fragmented and incoherent.4
The push for modernization caused a backlash among various groups of people including socialists,
liberal-nationalists, students, elites, and clerical leaders. By focusing on the westoxicated nature
of the project, all these movements shared a longing for nationalism, populism, and social justice.
The backlash, under the charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, turned into an unstoppable
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uproar and finally ended in a revolution. After the revolution, bolstering the Islamic ideology was
pursued further by writing a new constitution and revising “the content of education and the style,
character and terrain of political action.”5 The goal of revisions, however, was not only to overhaul
the social system of the country but also to destabilize populism and to bolster the sovereignty of
the clerical power structure.
In Domesticity and Consumer Culture in Iran, Pamela Karimi presents a thorough examina-
tion of the impact of the Islamic regime’s radical revisions on the quotidian lives of people, most
notably those of women. She believes the Shah’s mistake was his attempt to turn the country into
a market for foreign corporations and leaving the domestic businesses on the brink of bankruptcy.
She explains,
In 1964, the American President Lyndon B. Johnson said, “What is going on in Iran,
is about the best thing going on anywhere in the world,” and his ambassador to Tehran
chimed in, “The Shah (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) is making Iran (a) showcase
of modernization in this part of the world.”6
Clerical leaders, by pursuing an anti-Western and an anti-Eastern agenda, isolated Iran from the
rest of the region and started to criticize the westoxicated nature of the cultural, sociopolitical, and
economic discourses of the country. After the revolution, by labeling the widely used American
commodities as haram (illicit), the public and private lives of Iranians began to get Islamized. One
of the outcomes of this Islamization was the gender segregation of public spaces. Karimi asserts,
“The spatial segregation of the sexes was forcefully implemented in public spaces. Most govern-
ment institutions, staircases, and corridors became gender segregated. On university campuses,
in sport stadiums, and on public transportation, new rules either limited or barred inter-gender
interactions.”7 She continues, “Bars in buses separated the spaces for women at the back of the
bus from that of men at the front. Meanwhile, workplaces and other public institutions upheld sex
segregation and instituted daily collective prayers.”8 The push for rearranging public places based
on a gendered specific agenda forced Iranian people, specifically women, to hide their true identi-
ties in public. The segregation and the inevitable appearance of dichotomies such as public/private,
westoxication/Islamization, and permissible (halal)/illicit (haram) became a vehicle for the Islamic
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government to regulate and discipline the bodies and minds of the Iranian people.
In this dissertation, I investigate how Iranian artists use visual art and performance as sites of
resistance against the exclusionary rhetoric that Iranians encounter inside and outside the country.
Through this project, I am determined to show how these artworks and their artists (re)negotiate
the dominancy of the Islamic regime. I also demonstrate how, through creating alternative spaces,
these artists challenge and problematize the West’s, especially the United States’, tendency to
stereotype Iranians as radical Muslims and terrorists.
Performance Studies
This field explores the performativity of the alternative spaces that Iranian artists create to
challenge the cultural hegemony inside and outside Iran. Through these spaces, artists, by empow-
ering those who have been cast out of the normative and heterosexual cultural discourses of both
Iran and the West, question and problematize the limitation of race and gender binaries. The main
texts that support my argument in this area are Ann Cvetkovich’s An Archive of Feelings, Trauma,
Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Cultures; Peggy Phelan’s Unmarked: Politics and Performance; and
Lisa Lowe’s Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics. I also incorporate writings and
blog posts by Bavand Behpoor, an Iranian art theorist and art critic based in Chicago, to criticize
the limitations of so-called Iranian contemporary art and its appeal within the Western cultural dis-
course. As Behpoor puts it, “It seems as if we can no longer talk of the East and the West, but the
West and the rest.”9 It is precisely this “rest,” especially the Middle Eastern region, that has been
strategically left out of the current conversation in the popular cultural discourse and its scholarly
works; this dissertation will expose the cause of this exclusion through its case studies.
Ann Cvetkovich, in An Archive of Feelings, Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Cultures,
investigates and criticizes the limitations of traditional archives and their resistance in recording
and preserving marginalized voices. For her, trauma becomes a means of intervening in tradi-
tional archives, as it “puts pressure on conventional forms of documentation, representation, and
commemoration, [gives] rise to new genres of expression, such as testimony, and new forms of
monuments, rituals, and performances that can call into being collective witnesses and publics.”10
11
Since in Iran, the official recording of history is subjected to official revision, art in general and
performance in particular have become alternative means of preserving history. By focusing on the
traumatic experiences of marginalized people, mostly women and homosexuals, art has started to
(re)tell and archive narratives that fall outside the established and patriarchal cultural discourse of
the country. However, due to the hegemonic culture’s tendency in eliminating whatever digresses
from its main line of ideology, these archives are condemned to be ephemeral. Spectators, while
gathering to witness testimonies, interviews, or performances, try to identify their own stories and
memories with those presented on stage. It is through this act of exchange that the spectators shape
and share a new sort of history, an ephemeral and unofficial one filled with intimate and intense
emotional encounters. The decision of not recording the history of minorities is a political act
charged with the idea of accentuating the importance of ephemerality and disappearance in the
context of the country’s power structure. As Cvetkovich argues, “For this reason and others, the
archive of feelings lives not just in museums, libraries, and other institutions but in more personal
and intimate spaces, and significantly, also within cultural genres.”11
Peggy Phelan thoroughly explores the problems associated with recording and preserving
ephemeral events in her groundbreaking book Unmarked: Politics and Performance. As she con-
tends, “Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the cir-
culation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than
performance.”12 The efficacy of performance, for Phelan, is in its disappearance and its consump-
tion by the spectators. She states, “Without a copy, live performance plunges into visibility – in
a maniacally charged present – and disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility and the
unconscious where it eludes regulation and control.”13 In countries where everything is subjected
to official revision, invisibility sometimes becomes a political act, a sort of resistance to visibil-
ity desired by military intelligence and police force. The capability of being efficacious through
ephemerality empowers works such as Endless Monologue in constituting alternative ways of nar-
rating the stories of marginalized groups.
Although writing about a performance piece with the hope of accurate preservation is asso-
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ciated with failure, Phelan contends that its role in “reimagining of the social bond” is undeni-
able. The ability of critical writing to problematize the exclusionary rhetoric of the Islamic regime
becomes significant in the context of what Muslim scholars and artists tend to do in diaspora.
Through their cultural activism, these artists and scholars not only challenge the political structure
of their regimes, but also seek to rearticulate the imposition of dichotomies such as legal/illegal,
citizen/noncitizen, and alien/permanent resident within their host(ile) countries’ immigration laws.
As Lisa Lowe argues in Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics,
Where the political terrain can neither resolve nor surpass inequality, it erupts in cul-
ture. Because culture is the contemporary repository of memory, of history, it is
through culture, rather than government, that alternative forms of subjectivity, col-
lectivity, and public life are imagined. This is not to argue that cultural struggle can
ever be the exclusive site for practice.14
Lowe, in her comprehensive study of the immigration laws in the United States, positions cul-
ture as a viable means for immigrants to surmount the exclusionary rhetoric and the simulacrum
of inclusion within their host(ile) country. Within this dissertation, I combine Lowe’s theoriza-
tion of immigrants’ performativity with Hamid Naficy’s conceptualization of exilic art. In The
Making of Exile Cultures: Iranian Television in Los Angeles, Naficy investigates the ways that
the Iranian community negotiates its position in relation to the cultural hegemony of the United
States. He argues, “exile is a process of perpetual becoming, involving separation from home, a
period of liminality and in-betweenness that can be temporary or permanent, and incorporation
into the dominant host society that can be partial or complete.”15 This dissertation investigates the
performativity and importance of this liminal stage regarding the formation of Iranianness inside
and outside the country. In addition, through the theories of performance, this project explores
the strategic ways employed by Ghadirian, Alizad, and electronic music artists to document and
commemorate the experience of those cast out by the hegemonic power of cultural discourses both
inside and outside the country.
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Ritual and Religion Studies
The impact of Islam on defining and marking Iranian identity is an undeniable fact. While
inside Iran loyalty to Islam is a necessity, in abroad it is a sign of radicalism and barbarism. As a
result, this field, on the one hand, demonstrates how artists attempt to secularize cultural venues of
the country through showing the possible flexibility of Islam as a viable political and ideological
system. On the other hand, this field, by showcasing the cultural achievements of Iranian artists,
tends to problematize the West essentialist outlook towards Islam. The major texts that support the
argument proposed in this section are Catherin Bell’s Ritual Theory and Ritual Practice in which
she has formulated the theory of ritualization and ritualized body, Victor Turner’s From Ritual to
Theatre, The Human Seriousness of Play and Ronald Grimes’s Readings in Ritual Studies.
Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice by Catherin Bell studies the genealogy of ritual studies in re-
lation to long held binaries such as theory/practice and thought/action. By problematizing such
dichotomies, Bell seeks to propose ritual as a viable theoretical framework for the better under-
standing of the interdependent relationship between religion and culture. In order to do so, she
starts her examination by categorizing the history of ritual studies into three parts; ritual as a way
of exploring religion, ritual as a way of analyzing social phenomenon, and ritual as a catalyst for
exploring ‘culture’. Exploring ritual as a possible framework of cultural studies led Bell to suggest
the theory of ritualization, which, as she describes it, is a way of “[describing] the strategies of the
ritualized act by deconstructing some of the intricacies of its cultural logic.”16 The ritual knowledge
and mastery that come with ritualization enable its agent to understand and interpret the reality of
her/his redemptive hegemonic order more efficiently. As Bell proposes, ritualization is not a new
theory; it is a new framework for reworking old questions related to ritualistic performances within
a “rightful” context.
In From Ritual to Theatre, The Human Seriousness of Play, Victor Turner elaborates a theory
which he labels as “social drama”. This theory, Turner explains, is a “dramas of living”, and it “can
be aptly studied as having four phases. These I label: breach, crisis, redress, and either reintegration
or recognition of schism.”17 Turner’s theory of social drama is based on Van Gennep’s idea of rite
14
of passage which he distinguishes three phases for it: separation, transition, and incorporation.
One of Van Gennep’s greatest contributions to Turner’s theory is his definition of “limen”, a phase
when
the ritual subjects pass through a period and area of ambiguity, a sort of social limbo
which has few (though sometimes these are most crucial) of the attributes of either the
preceding or subsequent profane social statuses or cultural states.18
Tuner, by contextualizing the definition of “limen” in his theory of social drama, believes that the
redressive mood is a liminal stage where not only a reversal of familiar elements happens but also
an anti-structure or a “communitas,” is developed as a strategic way of coping with crisis.xiii Thus,
it is through this third phase and its liminal characteristic that a feedback on crisis is provided and
the reintegration or recognition of a schism becomes possible. Within this dissertation, I argue that
most of the Iranian artworks happen in this liminal space where they reflect on the sociopolitical
and cultural discourses of the country in order to redress the various governmental infringements.
Readings in Ritual by Ronald Grimes is a collection of various essays by ritual and perfor-
mance scholars. Most notable among them is an essay by Caroline Walker Bynum, “Women’s
Stories, Women’s Symbols: A Critique of Victor Turner’s Theory of Liminality,” who criticizes
Victor Turner’ theory of social drama. Walker Bynum believes that Turner, by isolating the role
of women to a liminal phase, “looks at women” instead of “looking with them.” She argues that
Turner “stands with the dominant group (males) and sees women (both as symbol and as fact)
as liminal to men.”19 In the other words, Turner positions women in the liminal stage in order to
use them as a reversed image of the dominant male group. This image of women is constantly
exploited as a way of reification of men’s pride, domination, and ambition. Due to the marginal
status of women throughout the history, Walker Bynum argues, the narratives of women (which
are frequently told by male biographers) are less climactic and processual and unable to fit into a
social drama theory.
The women are thus, to the men, a retreat from the world into inner, often mystical
repose. What she says (and her rhetoric is sometimes strident) and what she is, is a
xiiiFor further reading refer to Ritual to Theatre, The Human Seriousness of Play, Victor Turner, p. 44.
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criticism of male power and an alternative to it. Contact with her is, for the male,
an escape from the world; after recourse to her he returns to that world girded with
information and consolation.20
Thus, as Walker Bynum concludes, social drama theory is an approach suitable for male storytellers
to reify and impose the gender binary. She concludes that if we shift our perspective, what we
will witness is a miserable failing of social drama theory in retelling women’s stories. In my
dissertation, I argue that within a totalitarian power structure, where reaching a social and political
climax is equated with getting arrested, such a limitation works in benefit of women instead of
against them.
Chapter Description
Chapter 1, “Monologues of Resistance, Art, and Performance in Iran,” starts with offering com-
prehensive research on the sociopolitical history of Iran within the past fifty years that leave visual,
literary and sonic traces in the works of the artists explored later in the chapter. Beside Iran, the
sociopolitical and cultural impacts of the United States’ intervention in Middle East, specifically
in Iran during Pahlavi regime, is also investigated. In its second half, the chapter examines the
importance and performativity of Shadi Ghadirian’s Like EveryDay photo collection and 84The-
atre Company production of Endless Monologue within the delineated sociopolitical and cultural
contexts.
Investigating the outcomes of the U.S. imperial proclivities in the Middle East, Chapter 2,
“Bewildered They Stood, Like An Empty Oath, Like a Solemn Kurd: Mountain Language and
Its Plea for Justice,” demonstrates the fallacies associated with whitewashed ideologies supporting
the invasion of the Middle Eastern countries under the justification of the “War on Terror.”xiv This
chapter further argues that the Middle Eastern countries, including Iran as one of the most stable
states in the region, are not in the need of intervention by imperialist powers to fix their “problems.”
To examine these arguments, this chapter analyzes the production of Mountain Language, written
xiv“War on Terror” was a term used by George W. Bush following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack.
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by Harold Pinter and staged by Ali Akbar Alizad, the head of 84Theatre Company, in Tehran, Iran.
This production specifically focused on the political violence imposed on the political prisoners
within the country as well as without. It also criticizes the race-based discrimination and political
exclusion that brown bodies encounter in the West, especially in the United States.
Chapter 3, “She’s Red & Black, Circling Round, I Jumped So Hard, I Died, There, She
Was,”xv investigates the underground electronic music movement in Iran alongside of its bold pres-
ence in international scene. Though domestically this movement was limited to hold their concerts
and gigs in warehouses and art galleries, various international labels have invested their sources
and interests in distributing the works of these artists. While the chapter explores the performa-
tivity of the Iranian electronic music movement in promoting and mobilizing the emancipatory
hopes for reconfiguring the cultural domain of the country, it argues that the movement’s appeal
within the Western capitalistic market can become somewhat problematic and an extra racial tool
in reification of old paradigms such Orient/Occident binary.
Finally, Chapter 4, “Em-Bracing the Liminal rather than Nostalgia,” by acknowledging the
positionality of the author as an Iranian, female, scholar based in the United States, reflects on the
argument proposed throughout the dissertation. This chapter also proposes questions that remain
unanswered and the further research and scholarly works that needs to be done in the field of
Middle Eastern Art and Performance.
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Monologues of Resistance, Art, and Performance in Iran
Figure 2.1: Mohammad Hossein Zarqam, From Self-Destruction Series, 2012
In 2012, Mohammad Hossein Zarqam, a young Iranian artist, burned his birth certificate
in front of a camera as part of his performance piece, entitled Self-Destruction. “The photograph
appeared online, was admired by 117 other people of his generation and was finally sold to another
young artist for less than 100 Euros. It would cost him much more and would take him months to
get a second copy of his birth certificate if he intends to do so.”1 Zarqam’s symbolic act of burning
his birth certificate criticized the ways that Iranian identity is perceived and practiced within and
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without the country. As a young artist in Iran, Zarqam is looked upon as a westoxicated personi
obsessed with the ideology of secularism and devoid of any respect for the Islamic values of the
1979 revolution. While Zarqam is excluded and marginalized in his own country, outside Iran, due
to his Iranianness, he is categorized as an (radical) Islamist supporting terrorism and the abolition
of the Western civilization.ii Thus, not only does his performance indicate a political violence
directed at his identity inside Iran but more importantly it exposes the fallacies of the essentialist
narratives perpetuated by the United States aiming toward substituting group-based behavior for his
individuality. Such a group-based behavior is exemplified in the U.S post 9/11 racial and political
rhetoric where the interchangeable use of Arabs and Muslims has become a strategic means for
waging and continuing “War on Terror.” One of the notable examples is Saxby Chambliss, “a
republican congressional representative and future senator of Georgia, [who] informed a group of
law enforcement officers that the best antiterrorist measure for his district would be to “turn loose”
the local sheriff and “let him arrest every Muslim that crosses the state line.”2 Such representation
of Muslims were backed by other Republican Representatives including John Cooksey who in
his interview with a talk show host asserted, ““someone who comes in that’s got a diaper on his
head and a fan belt wrapped around that diaper on his head, that guy needs to be pulled over.””3
Situated within such biased representations, Iranians found themselves in a newly formed identity
negotiation where the rejection or practice of Iranianness would have brought serious repercussions
for its subject.
Zarqam’s subversive performance piece addresses such a dual attitude toward Iranianness
where a complex cultural formation of a whole nation is being retooled based upon sociopolitical
iThe push to modernize and westernize the cultural hegemony in Iran started during Reza Shah Pahlavi, who
became ruler of Iran in 1941. However, this push was so sudden that it caused a backlash among a group of Iranian
intellectuals including Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Daryush Shayegan, and Reza Davari. By labeling the West as the ‘Other,’
these intellectuals believed such a process of westernizing the country was to put an end to the authentic Iranian culture
and its political and economic sovereignty in the Middle East. By calling those in favor of the change “westoxicated,”
they encouraged Iranian people and elites to preserve their cultural identity. From early 1960s onwards, the ideas and
theories of this group of elites dominated the Iranian outlook towards the West. The gap created between period of
westernization of the country followed by a strong anti-western ideology of Islamic Republic regime radically affected
the ways Iranian identity got perceived and practiced not only by Iranian themselves but also by the “others.”
iiThough such an essential outlook toward Iranianness gained currency through political rhetoric employed by
colonizer countries such as Britain and France, here the discussion is focused on the United States, especially post
9/11, when the stigmatization of Muslims was pursued under the justification of “war on terror.”
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conditions defined by hegemonic powers. Thus, in what follows, first, I ask how does the sta-
tus of Iranian identity, particularly during the post 9/11 era, is understood within its domestic as
well as U.S. contexts. To answer this question, I investigate the status of Iranianness by explor-
ing its transition over the past fifty years and within three eras: pre-revolutionary (1925-1979),
post-revolutionary (1979-2009), and the Green Movement (2009-2010). Second, I demonstrate
how within such repetitive pattern of (mis)representation of Iranian identity, both inside and out-
side the country, the contemporary art scene has become the battleground where new definitions
of Iranianness are being constructed and practiced. In order to do so, I employ two case studies, a
photo collection by Shadi Ghadirian, Like EveryDay, and a performance piece by 84Theatre Com-
pany, Endless Monologue, where recording the voice of minorities become a means of resisting
the stereotypes associated with Iranianness.
Part I: Iranianness and U.S. Racial Discourse
Within the rationale of the Western cultural hegemony, in general, and the United States, in partic-
ular, Islamic states have always been reduced to generalized labels such as backward and barbaric
countries or oil suppliers who benefit from the global petro-aggression. In case of Iran, the negative
stereotypes, e.g., religious fanatics, barbaric nation, and radical Islamists, have become an indis-
pensable feature of introducing the whole nation into the U.S. mainstream culture. As Edward W.
Said, in Covering Islam, How the Media and Expert Determine How We See the Rest of the World,
argues,
Whatever Iranians or Muslims say about their sense of justice, their history of oppres-
sion, their vision of their own societies, seems irrelevant; what counts for the United
States instead is what the “Islamic revolution” is doing right now, how many people
have been executed by the Komitehs, how many bizarre outrages the Ayatollah, in the
name of Islam, has ordered. Of course no one has equated the Jonestown massacre or
the destructive frenzy produced at the Who concert in Cincinnati or the devastation of
Indochina with Christianity, or with Western or American culture at large; that sort of
equation has been reserved for Islam.4
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Ignoring countries such as Indonesia, Philippines, and India, homes to the world’s majority
Muslim populations, the Western mainstream media has succeeded in re-presenting Islam within
the stereotyped frameworks such as the on-going Israel – Palestine conflict, Iranian aggressive
policy towards the United States, or the Syrian refugee crisis as a possible future hub for terrorists.
The interchangeable use of terms such as “Muslim,” “Islamists,” “radical terrorists,” “Iranians,”
and “Arabs” has provided a platform for labeling any Middle Eastern country with whom the West,
especially the United States, finds incompatibilities with. In Militant Islam Reaches America, the
historian Daniel Pipes, nominated by President George W. Bush for serving on the board of the
United States Institute of Peace, describes Muslims, by lumping them all together, as “Islamists,”
“anti-moderate,” “anti-Semitic,” “unwilling to coexist,” and barbarians who are “revolutionary in
their outlook, extremists in their behavior, and totalitarian in their ambition.”5 The hallmark of such
a radical and charged rhetoric was the travel ban imposed by President Donald Trump on seven
Muslim majority countries of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia on January 27th,
2017. Though President Trump repeatedly stated that his executive order was not a “Muslim ban,”
but a ban on countries that impose serious threats to the safety of the United States, his rhetorical
use of the word “ban” and his ideology toward Islam proved otherwise. President Trump’s ban,
considered by many as one of the most radical orders issued on the topic of the Muslim immigration
and “War on Terror,” bears with it a great history of hostility toward Islam in the United States and
follows a tradition of demonizing Muslims as dangerous foreign enemies and the “Others” within
the American racial hierarchy.
Parallel to the closing stage of the Cold War, the United States found itself faced with a
void or a lack of purpose for pursuing and imposing its global hegemony and leadership. Such a
political vacuum materialized itself in the ideology of the rogue state introduced by the Reagan
administration:
Throughout the Cold War, the atheism of Communism served Americans as one of
the primary measures of difference with the United States. Americans came to treat
Communism as a type of “perverted faith” that supplanted the proper values of in-
dividualism and freedom promoted by true religions. Perhaps this notion informed
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President Ronald Ragan’s famous description of the Soviet Union as an “Evil Em-
pire.” It is also significant that, two decades later, President George W. Bush defined
another realm of malevolence when he declared North Korea, Iraq, and Iran an “Axis
of Evil.” By associating two Muslim-majority nations with the evil of Communist
North Korea, Bush suggested that Islam was replacing Communism as the ideology of
perennial conflict in America’s foreign affairs and perpetual fear in domestic life.6
The substitution of the fear of Communism with a rogue state ideology provided former President
Ronald Reagan’s administration an opportunity to launch an air raid on Libya in 1986 and to
encourage Iraq to invade Iran. After President Reagan, President George H. W. Bush identified Iran
and Iraq as ambitious states equipped with ballistic missiles adequate to jeopardize the geopolitical
stability of the U.S. and its economic interests in the Middle East. Based on the 1992 Defense
Planning Guidance,iii which was leaked and printed in the New York Times and the Washington
Post, the general U.S. policy within the Middle Eastern region was designed mostly to prevent
“any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control,
be sufficient to generate global power.”7 By putting Iran, Iraq, and North Korea on top of that
list, the Bush administration started to accuse these countries of developing weapons of mass
destruction to justify the need for militaristic intervention in the region. After President George
H. W. Bush, President Clinton adopted a more moderate approach “by coming close to offering
Iran their much-desired apology for past American actions when he accepted that Tehran had been
the subject of ‘abuse from various Western nations’ and had ‘right to be angry’ at [the U.S.].”8
Clinton, as Alex Miles, in U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rogue State Doctrine, asserts, “in remarks
quite possibly aimed at Congress and pro-Israeli pressure groups, asserted that the U.S. could not
afford to remain in ‘total denial’ when in conversation with adversaries.”9 Fed up with Clinton’s
diplomatic approach, Republicans were anxious to find a reason to reinforce their tough stance
on the rogue states. A most notable example is Republican senators including Sam Brownback
who, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, started to accuse Iran for its plan of developing weapon
of mass destruction and becoming the hegemonic power in the Middle East through waging wars
iii1992 Defense Planning Guidance was a pre-emptive plan designed to suppress the formation of any hegemonic
power within the Middle Eastern region provided by Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowits.
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on the U.S. allies.10 Such labeling happened in spite of Iran’s cooperation with the U.S. on the
issue of Afghanistan when the Iranian government proposed the U.S. with an opportunity to join
its coalition against Taliban. During the meeting in Geneva in the Fall of 2001, with the presence
of countries such as Iran, the United States, India, Russia, and Germany, a plan for the next Afghan
government was set to be discussed and mapped out. As Trita Parsi, in A Single Roll of the Dice,
describes,
On the last night of the conference, an interim constitution had been agreed upon and
all other issues had been resolved except the toughest: who was to govern Afghanistan?
The Northern Alliance insisted that, as the winner of the war, the spoils should be
theirs. Though they represented about 40 percent of the country, they wanted to oc-
cupy eighteen of the twenty-four ministries. At around two o’clock in the morning,
Dobbins brought together the Afghan parties, the Iranians, the Russians, the Indians,
the Germans, and Lakhdar Brahimi of the UN to resolve this final point. For two hours,
the various delegations took turns trying to convince the representative of the North-
ern Alliance to accept a lower number of ministries, to no avail. Finally, the Iranian
representative took him aside and began whispering to him in Persian. A few minutes
later, they returned to the table and the Afghan conceded. “Okay, I give up,” he said.
“The other factions can have two more ministries,” the next morning, the historic Bonn
agreement was signed, American had not only won the war, but, with the help of Iran,
it had also won the peace. For the Iranians, this was a moment of triumph.11
Despite Iran’s cooperation, George W. Bush on January 29, 2002, in his first State of the Union
address called Iran, alongside of Iraq and North Korea as “Axis of Evil.” Iranian government,
who were shocked by the Bush’s administration take on their cooperation, called the label a total
disgrace and an instigator of the U.S. undesirability of diplomatic relationship with Tehran.
Following the 9/11, the United States’ tough stance on Muslims initiated domestically by
launching programs such as the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), de-
signed to stigmatize the Muslim communities within the cultural hegemony of the country.iv By
repeatedly stating, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorist,” President Bush not only
ivThe National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) was only one example among many that was
implemented by Bush administration as a means of racially profiling Muslims. Based upon NSEERS program, all the
non-immigrant males over the age of sixteen and descend from selected countries register at the moment of crossing
the U.S. borders. Such orders and programs imply that those who pose threats to the U.S. national security are always
not American as they are foreigners, from Islamic faith and are only from few countries within the Middle Eastern
region.
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revitalized racial binaries such as us/them but also situated Muslims in the place of the “Other”
where Americans could identify themselves, their vulnerability, and their immediate need for mil-
itarized protection. Through such rationalization, the “War on Terror” becomes a pre-emptive
strategy necessary for preserving America’s domestic safety.
By introducing Islam as an inherently radical ideology, the practicing of which automatically
poses threats to the safety of the Western world, the Western cultural hegemony started to antago-
nize Islam full-forcibly. For instance, instead of introducing Islam as an anticolonial rise formed
around a religious ideology, Islam started to get (re)articulated as a political ideology aiming to
radicalize its followers. A case in point is the U.S. coverage of the Egyptian uprising in 2011 and
the fall of Hosni Mubarak, the then U.S. backed president of Egypt and a renowned violator of
human rights in the region. After the 2011 uprising in Egypt, despite U.S.’ attempts, Mubarak
resigned and the Muslim Brotherhood came to power by winning the popular vote in a freely
held election. The Obama administration decided to give the Muslim Brotherhood the benefit of
the doubt and hoped that the new regime would prevent the spread of anti-American sentiment
among masses. Following such a general policy, the American mainstream media started to por-
tray Mohammad Morsi, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, as a moderate leader, alumni of
the University of California and an avid fan of the American football.12 What went unaddressed
among such strategic reportage was the U.S.’ undeniable role in the rise and fall of Mubarak along-
side his dysfunctional socio-economic model which was endemic in creating a massive inequality
among the Egyptians.v
vAs Stephen Maher in, “The Political Economy of the Egyptian Uprising,” contends, “Since the death of nation-
alist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser thirty years ago, Egypt has embarked on a process of neoliberalization, largely at
Western instigation. In bringing Egypt out of colonialism and feudalism, Nasser created an authoritarian and highly
centralized economy. After Egypt’s crushing defeat by Israel in 1967, his successor, Anwar Sadat, signed a peace
treaty with Israel in 1978 with Washington’s sponsorship, opening the door to Egypt’s inclusion within the U.S. im-
perial system. U.S. aid to the Egyptian regime grew rapidly, while Sadat commenced a policy of infitah (or openness)
that set in motion Egypt’s neoliberal transformation and tied its economy to international capital, a process accelerated
by Mubarak after Sadat’s assassination in 1981. When the Egyptian debt crisis of 1982–90 forced it to go to the multi-
national Paris Club to restructure its debt, the IMF imposed a neoliberal structural adjustment program as a condition
for continuing the flow of credit. The IMF conditions forced the government to cut spending on social services, relax
price controls, cut subsidies, deregulate and privatize industries, target inflation, and liberalize capital flows. This
program would break the powerful Arab Nationalist regional solidarity of the Nasser years and consolidate the power
of a ruling class linked to global capital, with whatever disastrous consequences that entailed for the lower classes.
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Fed up with preserving the interests of Western businesses, Egyptians trusted the Muslim
Brotherhood to bring the power back to local businesses and to solve the economic and social
shortcomings of their country. Once Muslim Brotherhood demonstrated that they were incapable
of fulfilling its initial promises, its capitalistic and colonized nature became evident and Egyptians
once again flooded the streets to show their frustrations with the Western intervention in their coun-
try’s affairs. The Egyptian demonstration revived the U.S. nightmare “in which the people of the
Middle East might begin to free themselves from the vested interests of pro-Western business and
military classes,”13 causing the total dismantlement of capitalistic ideology within the economic
system. After losing faith in Muslim Brotherhood’s ability in preserving free-market principle, the
United States restored its old stance on Islam as an inadequate political system and reverted to a
militaristic coup as the approach deemed to embrace people’s unfulfilled demands. Thus, as Arun
Kundnani, in Muslims are Coming, Islamophobia, Extremism and the Domestic War on Terror,
argues,
When the military began its brutal crackdown on dissent – killing hundreds of unarmed
protesters – it knew it did so with the support of the US government. A token and
temporary reduction in US aid to the Egyptian military did not alter their underlying
strategic partnership. And with the generals once again monopolizing power, the US
media’s brief flirtation with Morsi ended.14
Any crisis in the Middle East such as the 2009 Iranian protests, the Arab Spring, Egyptian
uprising, the Syrian refugee crisis, and the rise of ISIS, have always been framed within the context
of the United States’ concern for the violation of the human rights in the region or the incapability
or undesirability of Islam in spreading democracy. If human right was among the U.S.’ concerns,
why, then, the crimes committed by Saudi Arabia in countries such as Yemen were never ade-
quately reported in any of the American top news agencies? Why did the ISIS imposed genocide
This transformation had wide-ranging implications for social relations in Egypt, including growing inequality,
poverty, and social insecurity for the lower classes, as well as the violent exclusion of the millions who were con-
demned to abject misery. The neoliberal state dismantled social protections, gutting and privatizing Egypt’s health
care system and other social services along with many of the state-owned industries. During Mubarak’s rule alone,
food subsidies were reduced by more than 50 percent, while privatization frequently meant “less job stability, longer
hours, and a lower standard of social services for workers,” as a recent report by the Solidarity Center indicates; “this
was a rather effective means for disciplining the labor force.” For further reading please refer to Monthly Review,
Volume 63, Issue 06 (November), 2011.
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on religious minorities such as the Yazidisvi, who, due to President Trump’s travel ban, could get
trapped inside Iraq, receive little, if any, media coverage in the United States? Why are countries
such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates excluded, without any logical reasons,
from the list of the possible threats to the United States when fifteen of the nineteen hijackers in the
9/11 terrorist attacks were from these countries? Why is Iran constantly being demonized for its
nuclear activity while U.S.’ allies are free to add to their already massive nuclear artillery? Though
it is important to pay attention to the general hostility and passionate rage exercised towards Mus-
lims specifically within the United States’ mainstream culture, it is crucial to separate Iranians
from Arabs, Arabs from Kurds, and Kurds from Turks. The tendency to lump all Muslims together
should not become an additional racial tool for the United States to hide its nuanced policies to-
ward Muslim majority countries capable of destabilizing the growing hegemony of countries such
as Saudi or Israel in the region.
Part II: Iranianness and domestic transformation
The pre-revolutionary era in Iran started with Reza Shah Pahlavivii overthrowing the last shah of
Qajar, Ahmad Shah. Reza Shah reigned from 1925 to 1941 within which he attempted to mod-
ernize Iran and its traditional cultural hegemony to align it with those in the Western world.viii As
Mansour Farhang in Iran and The Prism of Political Culture explains, “Pahlavi’s official ideology
was formed out of a loose combination of selective aspects of Western cultural values and ethos
(increasingly American), and a romantic view of the ancient, pre-Islamic Persian civilization.”15
The noticeable fact about the Pahlavi’s regime was its dualistic attitude towards the national (Ira-
viThe Yazidi religious minority, whose beliefs are derived from Zoroastriansm, Christianity and Islam were sub-
jected to what the United Nations classified as genocide when ISIS militants overran their homes in northern Iraq in
the summer of 2014, killing and enslaving thousands of women and girls.
viiReza Shah Pahlavi is the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty who was appointed as a monarch of Iran through the
majority of Iran’s constituent assembly votes. His (controversial) dynasty was overthrown in 1979 and by Islamic
revolution.
viiiThe hallmark of modernizing Iran was to turn the country into a consumer of Western commodities. Importing
foreign goods resulted in the disappearance of small and local businesses who did not have the power to compete
with Western corporation. For further reading please refer to Pamela Karimi’s book titled Domesticity and Consumer
Culture in Iran, Interior revolutions of the Modern era.
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nian) identity. On the one hand, Reza Shah tried to westernize Iran expeditiously; on the other
hand, as the country’s monarch, he “demanded that Iran be used instead of Persia”16 to accentuate
the country’s new attitude and determination in becoming independent from other cultures. While
Reza Shah insisted on the usage of “Iran,” wherever it was beneficial, he incorporated the rich
and extravagant history of “Persian” culture to elevate the status of the country in the international
scene. “Persia,” as Mostafa Vaziri, in Iran as Imagined Nation, explains, “was an obscure term
that hardly explained the multiethnic population and did not correspond to anything in a general
scale of identity that the local inhabitant would refer to.”17 The interchangeable use of “Persia” and
“Iran,” thus, became a strategic means for the Pahlavi’s regime to disguise its political ambition in
becoming the hegemonic power of the region with the help of Western states such as Britain and
the United States.ix
Simultaneous to Reza Shah’s sociopolitical modernization of Iran, the cultural face of the
country underwent a radical transformation as well. Establishing Tehran University as “a center
for scientific and cultural modernism”18 in 1934 was “a key part of the modernization program.”19
Shortly after, the College of Fine Arts was founded in conjunction with the Tehran University and
was based upon the model of the École des Beaux-Arts of Paris. “The college established three
branches of art education: painting, architecture and sculpture. André Godard, its first director,
was in charge of arranging a curriculum for instruction and employing the teaching staff.”20 The
College of Fine Arts and its faculty, many of whom were educated in the Western world, played
a key role in introducing the Iranian public to the idea of modernism and culture of consumerism.
For instance, Parvaneh Etemadi, a famous Iranian painter, followed the steps of Andy Warhol in
creating and showcasing works that depict key American commodities such as Coca Cola bottles.
Outside of academia, too, several magazines, pamphlets, independent artists, and galleries facili-
tated a platform for the general public to get acquainted with the modernist ideology. As Maryam
ixToday, particularly in the diaspora, some Iranians take advantage of the confusion between “Iran” and “Persia”
only to separate themselves from the Islamic Republic regime of Iran. By calling themselves Persians, they create an
impression that either Iran is inside the Persia or Persia is a civilized version of Iran or that they are Persians and of
Aryan descent, thus different from those currently ruling the country. As Bavand Behpoor, an Iranian artist and art
theorist based in Chicago argues “It is not about being somebody, it is about not being someone else,” and it is not
about being an Irano-Islamist identifying with the dogmatic clerical regime dominating Iran.
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Ekhtiar and Marika Sardar argue “The 1949 opening of the Apadana gallery in Tehran, and the
emergence of artists like Marcos Grigorian (born 1925) in the 1950s, signaled a commitment to
the creation of a form of modern art grounded in Iran.”21 Thus, the Iranian art scene experienced
a period of collaboration with the Western world “as local artists participated in art fairs, founded
galleries, and courted foreign collectors.”22 The opening of the Tehran Museum of Modern Art,
with its attempt to bring together a “collection of both Western and Iranian artists,”23 counted
as one of the foremost achievements of this period. So, through the Pahlavi’s strategic cultural
overhaul, Iran slowly evolved into an unofficial colonized territory and a marketplace of Western
powers such as Britain and the United States. And “Once the Islamic revolution had taken place,
the reality of this “Westoxification” – to use a term popular at the time – continued to raise the ire
of the post-revolutionary elite.”24
The fast pace of transforming the cultural discourse of the country from its traditional status
to a more modernized and Western-based version caused a backlash among key Iranian intellec-
tuals and proponents of decolonizing Iran, most notable among them Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Daryush
Shayegan, and Reza Davari. By calling the West the “Other,” these intellectuals believed that such
a process of westoxicationx was to put an end to the authentic Iranian culture and its political and
economic sovereignty in the Middle East. By accentuating the authenticity of the Islamo-Iranian
identity, devoid of any trace of Western capitalistic culture, they “warned Asian intellectuals to
safeguard their cultural identity, ethnic memories and heritage in the face of the intellectuals’ as-
sault of Western thought.”25 Starting in the early 1960s, the anti-westoxication ideology advocated
by Al-e Ahmad and Daryush Shayegan, debunked the government’s attempts to transform the
country into a platform for sociopolitical and economical abuse by the First World countries.
While the anti-Western movement was struggling to gain a momentum necessary for challeng-
ing the authority of Pahlavi’s regime, Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, who at the time was in exile,
introduced himself on the world stage as a charismatic leader capable of coordinating and mobiliz-
x“Or Gharbzadegi [which] the genesis of this discourse is based on two interrelated issues which have confronted
Iranian intellectuals since the nineteenth century: the issue of self-identity, and that of the encounter with Western
civilization.” For Further Reading please refer to Iran Political Culture in the Islamic Republic, edited by Samih K.
Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi.
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ing multiple oppositional groups. Basically, “Khomeini, who had previously challenged the Shah’s
authority and was thus exiled to Turkey and Iraq, provided the missing link [among the multiple
oppositional groups].”26 And as Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi, in Iran Political
Culture in the Islamic Republic, argue, “In a patrimonial political culture such as Iran’s, charis-
matic patriarchal authorities are usually welcomed and emerge as lightning rods of socio-political
mobilization.”27 By constructing a strong political culture, Khomeini united all the social classes
and oppositional voices within an Islamic movement and toppled the Pahlavi regime in 1979. After
the revolution, however, the continuity of the extant populist ideology and its effectiveness came
under question as it “could spell potential instability and conflict for the post-revolutionary regime.
Thus, populism had to be controlled, redirected and passed into service of the Islamic Republic.”28
Upon reconstruction of the revolution’s core ideology and with the hope of becoming the region
hegemonic power, the Islamic regime adopted an anti-East/anti-West agenda and blocked the in-
fluence of the world powers on the country.
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Figure 2.2: Abbas Kowsari, Women’s Police Academi, 2005, Profession: Artist Magazine
To show the new regime’s independence from the West, on November 4th 1979, the Basij
(Iran’s military force) invaded the U.S. embassy and took sixty-five American diplomats hostage
for four hundred forty four days. Following the invasion, the United States closed its embassy
in Tehran and ended its diplomatic relationship with Iran. Parallel to the deterioration of Iran’s
relationship with the West, in September of 1980, the Iraqi army, supported and equipped by the
Western states, invaded Iran.xi The Iran-Iraq war continued for eight years during which significant
damage was done to Iran, particularly to its southern parts. Against all odds, Iran, through countless
sacrifices of its soldiers and unarmed citizens, successfully ceased the war in 1988.
The Islamic government resistance against Iraq’s invasion proved Iran’s determination in not
only asserting the country’s newly constructed independent identity but also in ending the signifi-
xiMelani McAlister, in Staging the American Century, Race, Gender, and Nation in the U.S Representation of the
Middle East, 1945 – 1992, explores the U.S. diplomacy toward the Iran-Iraq war and argues that throughout the war
U.S. provided “military and logistical support for Iraq” during the war.
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cant influence of countries such as U.S. and Britannia on the geopolitics of Middle Eastern states.
The process of decolonization of the country started right after the war as the sociopolitical, eco-
nomical, and cultural discourses of the country went through a severe transformation. Among all,
however, the cultural scene became the most radical manifestation of the country’s revisionist at-
titude; the segregation of the public spaces and imposition of a restrict gender policy, based upon
the regime’s interpretation of Shi’i ideology, became the symbol of the country’s departure from
Pahlavi’s westoxicated values. One of the offshoots of these changes was a departure of many
Iranians, including artists and business owners who found the new regulations impossible to adopt,
from the country to abroad, especially to the United States.xii
The process of transformation and implementation of the anti-East and anti-West agenda con-
tinued until 1997 and the rise of the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, a reformist who advocated
for the Islamic democracy and restoration of diplomatic relations with the international world, par-
ticularly the United States. During his eight years of presidency (1997-2005) Iran experienced a
period of relaxation in its regulations of economy and cultural discourses. As Hamid Keshmir-
shekan, in Contemporary Iranian Art, argues, Khatami’s presidential period “led to the emergence
of generation of artists whose main preoccupation was the idea of contemporaneity.”29 He, then,
continues, “Although no comprehensive study is available, the majority of the emergent artists
were young, educated and middle class. They also belonged mostly to the ‘third generation’ born
after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.”30
xiiThe years from 1980 through 1991, as Hamid Naficy, in The Making of Exile Cultures, argues, marks “the largest
Iranian emigration into the United States.” These years are “marked by extreme political polarization and antagonism
between the United States and Iran.” And, as Pamela Karimi explains, “Artists like Husseini were barred from dis-
playing their “capitalistic works” in local museums. Islamic revolutionaries drew a sharp distinction between local
and imported goods. Joint Iranian-Western production (the so-called “montage”) was considered haram (unlawful/-
forbidden by God) – as described in early post-revolutionary books such as Montage factories, Economic Priorities of
Iran: The Sinful Economy.” For further reading on Karimi’s argument please refer to her book titles Domesticity and
Consumer Culture in Iran.
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Figure 2.3: Shirin Aliabadi, Miss Hybrid #3, 2006, Profession: Artist Magazine
The growing ideological gap between the ‘third generation’ and the conservative first and second
generations evoked the fundamentalists, belonged to the Right Political Party and advocates of
backtracking the country to the core value of the revolution, to revolt against Khatami and to
call him a westoxicated politician. Parallel to these domestic troubles, the betrayal of George W.
Bush’s administration and inclusion of Iran within “Axis of Evil” ideology mounted the pressure
on Khatami and his cabinet.xiii As Trita Parsi, the founder and president of the National Iranian
xiiiAfter 9/11 attacks, Khatami’s administration saw the perfect opportunity to demonstrate Iran’s tough stand against
terrorism by aiding the U.S. with the conflict in Afghanistan. Iran invited U.S. to join its coalition with Afghanistan
in order to strategize a solution for unsettling the stability of Taliban. Iran’s aid would include, as Trita Parsi argues,
“to perform search-and-rescue missions for downed American pilots; they served as a bridge between the Northern
Alliance and the U.S. in the campaign against the Taliban; and they even used information provided by American
forces to find and kill fleeing al-Qaeda leaders.” During the Bonn Conference of December 2001, the representatives
of Iran, Afghanistan, U.S. and few European countries gathered to decide the feasibility of the project as well as the
future administration for the Afghanistan. Parsi explains, “The Northern Alliance insisted that, as the winner of the
war, the spoils should be theirs. Though they represented about 40 percent of the country, they wanted to occupy
eighteen of the twenty-four ministries. At around two o’clock in the morning, Dobbins brought together the Afghan
parties, the Iranians, the Russians, the Indians, the Germans, and Lakhdar Brahimi of the UN to resolve this final
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American Council, argues,
‘Axis of Evil’ was a fiasco for the Khatami government, said Farideh Farhi, an Iran
expert at the University of Hawaii. “It was used by hard-liners, who said: ‘if you give
in, if you help from a position of weakness, then you get negative results.” Hard-liners
argued that Iran should not have offered the U.S. any help without exacting a price
beforehand. Some Iranian diplomats involved in the Afghan talks were later forced to
pay for the calamity with their careers, making others think twice before extending a
hand of friendship to the U.S.31
While Khatami was healing the broken relationship between Iran and the United States and was
democratizing the country’s political rhetoric, by being labeled as a traitor and anti-Islamist Amer-
ican object, the fundamentalists took significant steps towards overturning his government.
In 2005, the fundamentalist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the national election to become the
sixth president of the Islamic Republic regime. He remained in power until 2013. During his eight
years of presidency, Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy and crude diplomacy provoked the international
world under the pressure of the United States to launch numerous economical and political sanc-
tions on Iran, most notably on its banking system and importing and exporting commodities to and
from the country. As his first term of presidency ended with a massive wave of criticism domes-
tically and internationally, the controversy over his re-election in 2009 caused uproar nationwide.
After being announced the seventh president of Iran through a landslide victory, his opponents,
most notably Mir Hussein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi, backed by their supporters, formed the
Green Movement and demanded a recount. As the uprising intensified, Ayatollah Khamenei, the
Supreme Leader of Iran, asked the protesters to end their street battles, suggesting that such unrest
would leave the country a divided nation. After Supreme Leader’s speech, the Ahmadinejad’s gov-
ernment suppressed the uprising and jailed all the Green Movement activists, including its promi-
point. For two hours, the various delegations took turns trying to convince the representative of the Northern Alliance
to accept a lower number of ministries, to no avail. Finally, the Iranian representative took him aside and began
whispering to him in Persian. A few minutes later, they returned to the table and the Afghan conceded. “Okay, I
give up,” he said. “The other factions can have two more ministries,” the nest morning, the historic Bonn agreement
was signed, American had not only won the war, but, with the help of Iran, it had also won the peace.” Iran through
its collaboration proved that it can be a reliable ally to the U.S. when it comes to the war on terror, as Taliban was
counted Iran’s enemy too. Despite Iran’s positive attitude, on January 29, 2002, George W Bush, counted Iran as one
of the “Axis of Evil.” This inclusion came as a shocked for the Khatami’s administration which was already under a
tremendous amount of pressure by the hard-liners inside the country.
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nent leaders, Moussavi and Karroubi. In the subsequent four years, due to the conservative and
sometimes hostile nature of the Ahmadinejad’s policies, the way that Iranianness was perceived
within and without the country changed radically. While domestically Iranians encountered a mas-
sive pushback from the new administration on reformative policies of Khatami, internationally,
too, they saw their identities being stereotyped within the context of radical Islamist rhetoric.
One of the safest battlegrounds for building new vocabularies of resistance and defining the
meaning of Iranianness, domestically and internationally, has been through artistic exchange be-
tween the so-called Middle East and the West. Within this chapter, this artistic exchange is exam-
ined in the context of two case studies, a photo collection by Shadi Ghadirian, Like Everyday, and
a performance piece by 84Theatre Company, Endless Monologue. By recording and re-presenting
the voice of minorities, both Ghadirian and Alizad create a gap capable of resisting, decoding, and
rearticulating the stereotypes associated with Iranianness. The works of these artists facilitate a
platform for revisiting issues such as racial discrimination, gender (un)performativity and identity
crisis among Iranians. Thus, what both of these artworks, Like EveryDay and Endless Monologue,
have in common is the performativity of identity within an environment dominated by censorship,
misrepresentation of the truth, and the lack of visibility for Iranians, nationally and internation-
ally. These artworks strategically utilize and transcend the invisibility and its performativity to
problematize the censorship practiced inside the country. Also, these artworks resist and upset the
Western States tendency in categorizing Iran as a backward, fundamentalist, and barbaric coun-
try. Questions associated with these artworks are contextualized within Daniel Martinez Hosang’s
racial formation theory, Hamid Naficy’s definition of exilic art, Pamela Karimi’s theorization of




Figure 2.4: Shadi Ghadirian, Like EveryDay, 2001-2, Artist’s Website
Shadi Ghadirian, one of the most progressive female photographers of the late 20th and 21st
century in Iran, was born in Tehran during the Islamic revolution. A graduate of the Azad Uni-
versity of Tehran in photography, her work “explores contemporary life in post-revolutionary Ira-
nian society with a focus on the role of women of her generation.”32 Ghadirian’s recognition as an
emerging female artist started with her first major photo collection, entitled Qajar (1998). This col-
lection exhibits thirty-three women posing in Qajar’s traditional costumes and carrying one modern
object “that in 1998 was either ‘forbidden’ or restricted, ranging from a Pepsi can to a boom box,
and including bicycles, musical instruments, books, makeup.”33 This photo series, which was also
her thesis project at the Azad University of Tehran, caused a great controversy among professors
of visual Art Department. After a long debate, the committee members rejected her project the
first time around. It was, however, due to this controversy and rejection that Ghadirian, among all
the other graduating students, was able to build a reputation for herself.
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Figure 2.5: Shadi Ghadirian, Qajar, 1998, Artist’s Website
Like EveryDay (2001-2002), a series that Ghadirian created after her marriage and experiencing the
banal life of a housewife in a traditional country such as Iran,xiv depicts women veiled in chador
with domestic objects such as iron, pan, cup, or a large knife covering the place of their faces.
Banned from displaying this series inside Iran, she featured them in a gallery in London where her
works attracted the attention of the Western curators.xv
The importance of Ghadirian’s Like EveryDay photo collection rests in its commentary on
xivWithin the traditional cultural hegemony of Iran, women were encouraged to not take the role of the breadwinner
of household and only support their spouses in fulfilling the financial needs of the family.
xvOn view from April 8 to July 31, 2016, Ghadirian’s works was also included in the National Museum of Women in
the Art exhibition, entitled She Who Tells a Story: Women Photographer from Iran and the Arab World in Washington
D.C. This exhibition was organized with the goal of probing the stereotypes within which the cultural hegemony of the
Middle Eastern countries is defined and realized. For further reading please visit https://nmwa.org/exhibitions/
she-who-tells-story.
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how the female body is (re)presented within Middle Eastern and the Western cultural hegemonies.
In Iran, the public (re)presentation of a female body is entangled with the dress codes advocated by
the State.xvi As an offshoot of the clerical regime’s initiative for promulgating the Islamic ideology,
the imposition of dress code was pursued with the hope of cleansing the country from Pahlavi’s
extravagant attempts to westernize Iran. To do so, the Islamic regime followed a strict gender
biased agenda targeting the segregation of males from females in public spaces. Based upon this
goal, the public spaces of the country started to get rearranged to the point that most of the women
considered the privacy of their homes as the best option for practicing and expressing their true
identities. As Pamela Karimi, in Domesticity and Consumer Culture, Interior Revolution of the
Modern Era, argues “The spatial segregation of the sexes was forcefully implemented in public
spaces. Most government institutions, staircases, and corridors became gender segregated.”34 She
then continues, “Bars in buses separated the spaces for women at the back of the bus from that of
men at the front. Meanwhile, workplaces and other public institutions upheld sex segregation and
instituted daily collective prayers.”35
The restrictions associated with (re)presenting a female body is a common practice in most
Middle Eastern countries where the female image is a permanent point of reference for “creating
metaphors for the loss of individualism, national rights, and political suppression.”36 In Egypt, for
instance, the Islamization process has changed the image of female performers from the respected
individuals to being read at large as the fallen ones. Fatna A. Sabbah, in Woman in the Muslim Un-
conscious, argues, “Muslim culture has a built-in ideological blindness to the economic dimension
of women, who are ordinarily perceived, conceived, and defined as exclusively sexual objects.”37
Thus the Islamic regimes, by eroticizing the female body, push women to either comply with the
dress codes or stay home. In the context of such an essentialist ideology, chadorxvii becomes a
xviThe formal dress code for women includes using a non-translucent hijab for covering hair and body. Quite
contrary to the general assumption in the West, while using chador is introduced as an ideal form of hijab, wearing it,
at least in Iran, is not compulsory.
xviiChador, a one-piece cloth covering from head to toe, veil, a mask covering the face, and hijab, a general term
indicating the necessity of covering female’s hair and body, are all terms referring to different forms of dress codes in
Islamic countries. For instance following the revolution, chador was considered as a standard dress code. However,
during the thirty years of Islamic reign and due to the relaxation implemented by reformist, the use of chador is not
compulsory. The interchangeable usage of chador and veil causes confusion about what is standard dress code in
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nuanced phenomenon signifying the women’s oppression as well as their courageous resistance.
However, if the goal is to exclude women from sociopolitical discourse or at least, to exclude those
who refuse to comply with the hegemonic ideology, then wearing chador/hijab becomes a strate-
gic means for countering the pressure and staying present for women. Encountered with the total
domination of the Islamic regime where an open resistance and rebellious act can become costly
for both protesters and the government, the renegotiation of the existing rules is the only viable
solution for fostering meaningful changes. It is this multilayered role of the chador/ hijab that goes
beyond the grasp of Western theorization of feminist movement which sees chador as a symbol of
the subjugated and backward Muslim women.
Considering chador as a nuanced phenomenon inspires different readings of Ghadirian’s pho-
tos, one that may remain unnoticed within the Western definition of women liberation. In these
photos, chador becomes a means for providing these women with a privacy that is almost impos-
sible to intrude. These women use their wrapped and hidden bodies as sites capable of bringing
personal space into political resistance. The intersectional nature of the Iranian women’s resistance
has its roots in the political and religious history. This history is explored by Homa Hoodfar who
in “More Than Clothing: Veiling as an Adaptive Strategy” argues,
Prior to the nineteenth century, the veil was never viewed as a symbol of Muslim
culture; the practice of the veiling and seclusion of women is in fact pre-Islamic and
originates in non-Arabic Middle Eastern and Mediterranean societies. The first ref-
erence to veiling dates to an Assyrian legal text of the thirteenth century BC, which
restricted the practice to “respectable” women and forbade prostitutes from veiling.
Historically, veiling – especially when accompanied by seclusion – was a sign of sta-
tus and was practiced by the elite in the ancient Greeco-Roman, pre-Islamic Iranian
and Byzantine empires. Muslims subsequently adopted the veil and seclusion. And to-
day it is widely recognized, by Muslims and non-Muslims, as an Islamic phenomenon,
presumably sanctioned by the Qur’an.38
During the Pahlavi dynasty and due to the attempts to modernize and secularize Iran, de-veiling
laws were imposed on women who resisted adapting themselves to the Western way of clothing.
De-veiling, then, became the symbol of colonized Iran and its subjugation to the Western hege-
different Middle Eastern countries. Unfortunately, while a majority of women chose to wear chador, this outfit has
become the symbol of an oppressed Middle Eastern women.
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monic powers, specifically the United States and Britain. During the 1978-79 revolution, women,
who were tired of being denied from practicing the basics of freedom of choice and expression,
joined the protesters and demanded the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime. The black chador, worn
by Iranian women during the massive uprising of 1978-79, signified the thirst for decolonization
of Iran and its liberation from Western manipulations. After the revolution, the regime, by un-
derstanding the power of symbols such as black chador in showcasing the Iranian’s determination
for independence, started to practice the compulsory veiling through new legislations. Veiling and
de-veiling, thus, bear a great history of political and personal resistance stereotyping of which
within narrow concepts of barbarity and backwardness is not only problematic but also aligned
with the essentialist and biased outlook of the Western cultural hegemonies. Ghadirian under-
stands this history and by avoiding any open denunciation of the State’s sensitivity on the issue of
(re)presenting the female image within Islamic ideology, finds a strategic way to renegotiate it. As
Julia Allerstorfer argues “Ghadirian therefore reiterates a common and official praxis of editorial
control, which is emphasized through the image’s isolation and ironized through its presentation
as an “artwork.””39 Like EveryDay is a radically non-white feminist statement by Middle Eastern
women who may become invisible but they never disappear.xviii Their invisible presence is per-
formative as these women, including Ghadirian, while are limited by the banality of domestic life
and marriage in the patrimonial cultural hegemony of Iran, never stop challenging the mediocracy
of the system. This performativity “is not a singular “act,” for it is always a reiteration of a norm
xviiiThis invisibility stands in sharp contrast with the depiction of a Muslim women in West, most notably, Holly-
wood movies or U.S. mainstream media. On the one hand, as Salwa Mikdadi Nashashibi, in Gender and Politics in
Contemporary Art, Arab Women Empower the Image, argues, “In the last two hundred years, the West has dissem-
inated a picture of Arab women as exotic, bondaged, romantic, distant, and mysterious. From the early nineteenth
century to the latest Hollywood images of the 1990s, the West has been the purveyor of this image. On the other hand,
as Sajida Alvi, Homa Hoodfar, and Sheila McDonough, in The Muslim Veil in North America: Issues and Debates,
contend, “Clearly, for many Muslims, veiling signifies their piety and spirituality, and they are unhappy with both the
wider society’s demonization of the veil as a symbol of oppression, and the elevation by some Muslims of the veil
as a symbol of Muslim identity, resistance, and even jihad. As well, there are women who have adopted the veil for
personal reasons stemming from their particular social contexts. Some wish to prevent alienation from their parents
and community as they engage in “unconventional” pursuits such as higher education and careers, which may entail
mingling with men, living alone and traveling to distant places. Other women are using Islam, including practices
such as veiling, to help break away from certain practices of their community’s patriarchal cultural traditions, such as
arrange marriages, which they find unacceptable. In short, for some women veiling can be empowering and in some
contexts even subversive.”
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or set of norms, and to the extent that it acquires as act-like status in the present, it conceals or
dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition.”40
While Ghadirian’s use of chador is performative and nuanced, there are artists who incorpo-
rate chador/veil as a social marker set to exoticize their art works. Most notable among them is
Shirin Neshat, a renowned Iranian artist based in the United States. Born in 1957 in Qazvin, Ne-
shat left the country shortly after the revolution and resided in the U.S. with the goal of attaining a
degree in Fine Arts. In 1990 and upon her visit to Iran, Neshat was surprised and perplexed by the
radically changed and Islamicized cultural and political discourses of the country. After witness-
ing the brutal restrictions imposed on Iranian women in public places, Neshat created one of her
best-known photo collections, Women of Allah (1993-97).
Figure 2.6: Shirin Neshat, Women of Allah, 1993-7
Photographing Iranian women covered with a veil embossed with Farsi words and embellished
with weapon-shaped jewelries, Neshat “challenged the perceptions of Iran’s social, cultural and re-
ligious codes by depicting militant Muslim women in whom she infuses the idea of martyrdom.”41
After Women of Allah, Neshat started to experiment with the medium of video installation. Tur-
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bulent, one of her most notable video arts, is a split-screen video art depicting male and female
performers singing one of the traditional Iranian hymns on the stage of a public auditorium.xix
While the male performance is watched and applauded by a crowded audience, the female singer
performs in front of an empty house. By limiting the female performance to kind of a private gig,
Neshat capitalizes on issues associated with dichotomies of man/woman and public/private within
the cultural hegemony of Iran. In addition to probing the gender-biased rhetoric of the Islamic
regime, Neshat also criticizes the hegemonic power of the patriarchy and taboos associated with
female’s performance within Iran’s traditional cultural discourse. As result of her “brave” com-
mentary on Iranian women’s condition, Neshat won the Lion d’Or in Venice Biennale in 1999 for
Turbulent.
Although Neshat’s commentary on the condition of the Muslim women in the Middle Eastern
countries is important, the appeal of her works within the Western mainstream culture is prob-
lematic as they are seemingly aligned with American stereotyped perceptions of Muslim identity.
Incorporating marketable objects such as (black) chador and Persian calligraphy aides Neshat to
identify herself as an exotic female artist based in the Muslim Diaspora. Her works reify the cred-
ibility of the “Occidental” outlook towards the so-called “Oriental” nations with backwardness,
barbarism, and traditionalism as their defining characteristic. Such depiction of Middle Eastern
culture is not only dated and mundane but also reiterates the ideology of “orientalism, which an-
chors war.”42 The logic of orientalism functions based on the idea of the West identifying itself as
the superior nation to the exotic and inferior Oriental people. The logic of this pillar is the anchor
for war as it works through demarcating a group of colored immigrants, most notably Iranians
and Arabs, as not white, however, white enough to pose a threat to the West. Andrea Smith, in
“Indigeneity, Settler Colonialism, White Supremacy,” unpacks the racialization of Arab/Muslim
from the point of view of the U.S white supremacy by contending, “Three primary logics of white
supremacy are (1) slaveability/anti-Black racism, which anchors capitalism; (2) Genocide, which
anchors colonialism; and (3) orientalism, which anchors war.”43 That first pillar, slaveability/anti-
xixFor viewing Turbulent please visit: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f2DNMG2s_O0
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Black racism, tends to look at black people as state property, a group of people whose labor is
commodified by the market and for the benefit of the capitalist hegemony. The second pillar fo-
cuses on strategies utilized by nonindigenous people for the occupation of indigenous people’s
lands and property. As Smith puts it, “Through this logic of genocide, non-native peoples be-
come the rightful inheritors of all that was indigenous-land, resources, indigenous spirituality, and
culture.”44 The third pillar, orientalism, functions based upon the idea of the West identifying itself
as the superior nation to the exotic and inferior Oriental people. The process of demonizing these
not white/not-not white nations starts with capitalization of their fundamentality, their totalitarian
political structures, and their religious dogmatism. Within such a context, chador, consequently,
becomes the most accessible symbol of oppression and barbarity signifying the hostility of Mus-
lims toward the democratic values of the West. Categorizing Muslims, especially those who prac-
tice their religion, as socially incompetent nations and threats to the Western democracies extends
the capacity to wage war.
Regarded as inherently fanatical and prone to violence, the figure of the Muslim/Arab
shows that the strictly biological basis of race is accompanied by the notion that “the
truth of race lies in the terrain of innate characteristics of which skin color and other
physical attributes provide only the most obvious, and in some respect the lost super-
ficial indicators.”45
Depictions of completely veiled, oppressed, and semi-militant Muslim women in the Middle East-
ern countries, such as those in Neshat’s photos, then becomes a reification of the post 9/11 racial
ideology centered on introducing Islam as a daily traumatic experience for Westerners.xx
Recognizing forceful veiling as a symbol of a country’s backwardness and barbarity is as
problematic as marking de-veiling as a sign of modernization and secularization. Between such
essentialist and biased interpretations, there exists variation of beliefs and ideologies that are sel-
dom discussed in a U.S. context. Thus, narrowing the discussions down to the role of the chador
xxAfter the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush, in his State of the Union Address, called Iran, Iraq, and
North Korea an “axis of evil” and declared the launch of the “war on terror” in the Middle East. Although it became
clear that none of these countries had supported the attacks, these three nations began to get racialized in a very
specific way. Iranians and Iraqis were labeled radical Muslims and terrorists; thus, their marginalization, harassment,
and discrimination in the international scene became necessary under the justification of preserving national security.
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and veiling as the baseline of oppression for Muslim women prevents the possibility of addressing
the multitude of problems encountered by all Muslims around the world. I offer the consideration
the idea that Iranian women wear hijab not because they are desperately oppressed but as an adap-
tive strategy to reform the culture from within. While artists such as Ghadirian are strategically
challenging the dogmatic nature of the Islamic ideology, imposed mostly from outside and by the
United States, artists such as Neshat are taking advantage of the appeal of objects such as chador,
militant Islam, and barbaric Muslim women within the Muslim Diaspora to find a market for their
artworks. Clearly, the most obvious outcome of such reification of the stereotypical assumption
about Muslim will support the West’s, specifically the United States’, quest for waging unlawful
wars on a selected number of Muslim majority countries in Middle East. Neshat’s photos, due to
their naïve and natural look turn into symbols signifying everything that is wrong with the Islamic
culture, e.g., its barbarism, fundamentalism, repressive nature, and the naiveté of the so called
Third World countries. In other words, these photos should not be looked upon as bare facts repre-
senting the lives of Muslim women in the Middle Eastern region; when produced by an artist based
in the Muslim diaspora, they are cultural objects within a clear-cut sociopolitical context proposing




Figure 2.7: 84Theatre Company, Endless Monologue, performed in a café in Tehran, 2011, Courtesy of the artist.
David Román, in Performance in America, defines performance as “a cultural practice that
does more than illustrate the social and historical context in which it is embedded.”46 He believes,
“[performance] shapes and transforms the way we understand and experience our lives.”47 By
bringing past and present together, in one singular moment, performance becomes a liminal space
where, free of presupposed rules and regulation, the exploration and reevaluation of sociopoliti-
cal and cultural norms of a society become possible.xxi Reflexivity, singular or plural, is then the
xxiThe argument of liminality is investigated in great detail by Victory Turner in his seminal book, From Ritual to
Theatre, The Human Seriousness of Play. Labeling it theory of “social drama,” Turner identifies four phase of breach,
crisis, redress, and either reintegration or recognition of schism as its characteristics. Tuner, by contextualizing the
definition of “limen” in the theory of social drama, believes that the redressive mood is a liminal stage where not only
a reversal of familiar elements happens but also an anti-structure or a “communitas” is developed as a strategy to cope
with crisis. Thus, it is through this third phase, with its liminal characteristic, that a feedback on crisis is provided and
a reintegration or recognition of a schism becomes possible. Turner’s nuanced approach to ritual is foregrounded in
his examination of the circumcision ritual practiced among Ndembu Mukanda tribe. As Bell, in Ritual: Perspective
and Dimensions, asserts “Turner provided a very detailed description of the Mukanda as he observed it among the
Ndembu in 1953, while also using other ethnographic accounts for comparison and amplification. His description
makes explicit use of the theoretical views of other interpreters, notably van Gennep and Gluckman.” (P 52) The
Mukanda of the Ndembu of northwestern Zambia enacts circumcision rite in order to turn boys into men. This rite
has three stages corresponding to the van Gennep’s tripartite theory of rite of passage; the first stage of van Gennep’s
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foremost feature of performance art; a feature that enables the community to see itself anew. This
ability to suspend the normative rules temporarily only to create alternative ways of looking (back)
at life becomes a necessity in countries where the hegemonic power has a total domination on var-
ious aspects of its citizens’ lives. A notable example of such a subversive quality of this art form is
a performance piece produced by 84Theatre Company, entitled Endless Monologue, in Ist gallery
in Tehran, Iran, in 2011. As one of the few active performance groups in Tehran, 84Theatre Com-
pany, under the direction of Ali Akbar Alizad,xxii focuses on alternative approaches in retelling and
memorializing marginalized stories of women, sexual assault survivors, and communities within
the patrimonial political and cultural discourses of the country.
During his trip to England, Alizad saw a verbatim performance piece in London.xxiii Con-
sidering verbatim theater a powerful means for exploring the sociopolitical issues of Iran, Alizad
started interviewing people whose stories he believed needed to be told. After interviewing six
people, Alizad chose three; the first interview was with Hamid, a homosexual doctoral student
who talked about his experience living as a gay person in Iran. His story was a detailed descrip-
tion of his rape in the outskirts of Tehran by four men and his coping mechanism afterwards. He
also described some of his childhood memories and the humiliations that he had endured during
his school years because of his sexual orientation. As a Ph.D. student, fluent in seven languages,
Hamid has experienced a constant discrimination and marginalization not only in public but also in
formula is separation known among the Mukanda as kwing’ija (“causing to enter”). At this preliminary stage, boys
are separated from their mother and their quotidian way of life and relocated into the bush. The second stage is known
as transitional or liminal phase identified by the Mukanda as kung’ula (“at the circumcision edge”). Within this phase,
boys are settled in a special sort of structure built for the enactment of the circumcision rituals. The final phase, known
by the Mukanda as kwidisha (“to take outside”), is when the young men’s are returned to their community. Turner
argues that the circumcision ritual of the Mukanda of the Ndembu demonstrates the internal conflict that exists between
the matrilineal and patrilocal relationship. The whole ritual, by separating the boys from their mother, circumcising
them and returning them instead to their fathers, is designed to affirm the supremacy of the patriarchy within the tribe.
xxiiAs the head of 84Theatre Company, Alizad, in addition of teaching script analysis and playwriting at the Art
University of Tehran, “engaged in theater since 1991; from that time his central interest focused on directing, but he
had many experiences in other theatrical fields such as writing and acting.” Considering theatre as a powerful means
for social change “he also works with Children Worker, women, and Afghan people.” Alizad founded the 84Theatre
Company based on the idea of staging the works of foreign playwrights such as Chekhov, Beckett, Pinter, and Mamet.
Most group members are students or alumnus from the Cinema and Theater Department at the Art University. Some
of the past performances by the group include productions Waiting for Godot (2004), Oleanna (2006), Two Latin
American Play by Ventura & Carbaeido (2006), Anniversary Celebration and Swan Song by Anton Chekhov (2007),
and Five Fragments by Samuel Beckett (2008). For further reading please visit www.84theatre.com
xxiiiVerbatim is a documentary form of theatre where true stories and interviews become the subject of the piece.
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private settings and gatherings. As a result, Hamid has always been faced with a constant struggle
in defeating his depression and loneliness forced upon him since childhood. “The attitude of this
country toward homosexuality is problematic. That’s why stories of individuals like Hamid are in
need of retelling and memorializing,”48 Alizad explained.
The second interview was with Setareh, whose father was executed under the accusation of
being a political activist. Setareh described her family’s shock after hearing the news of her father’s
unexpected execution and their vein attempts in seeking further justification and transparency.
Shortly after this traumatic event, her mother married a man who used to be the inmate of Setareh’s
father in prison. As she grew older, Setareh started to further question the death of her father,
particularly considering the no conviction verdict for her stepfather. Not knowing her father’s
burial place, Setareh explained that she continually struggles with the trauma of her loss. The third
and final interview narrated the story of Vida, who with the hope of finding independence and
resisting her father’s autocracy, went through a series of traumatic experiences such as abortion
followed by a failed attempt to flee the country. Devastated by her experience abroad, she finally
chose to return home. After a while, she left the country for the second time without ever returning.
Unable and reluctant to talk about their traumatic experiences publicly, the interviewees agreed to
work with Alizad who believed these stories bear enough momentum to foster awareness around
the issues associated with the oppressive nature of Iran’s traditional cultural discourse. Since the
interviewees insisted on remaining anonymous, Alizad recorded the interviews and edited them in
a nonlinear manner. During the performance, the performers, without mimicking the interviewees,
simply listened to the pre-recorded voices of Hamid, Setareh, and Vida, through their headsets,
and retold the audiences what exactly they had heard. At the beginning of each performance, the
performer, however, mentioned that the interviewees are present and anonymously are watching
their stories being (re)told.
By acknowledging the invisible presence of the interviewees, Endless Monologue compli-
cated the consumption mechanism of a performance piece by the spectators. Encountered with
a performance piece, the spectator usually is the one who remains invisible and unidentified in
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relation to the visible performer(s). In Endless Monologue the situation was reversed; the audi-
ence looked at the performers while both the audience and the performers were looked at by the
interviewees (Hamid, Setareh, and Vida). Thus, if in a normal situation the spectators attempt to
identify themselves in relation to the performers (the Other), in Endless Monologue the spectators
are in between and betwixt two representational economies; one that is visible and fictional and the
other that is invisible and factual. As Peggy Phelan, in Unmarked, contends “Identity is perceptible
only through a relation to another – which is to say, it is a form of both resisting and claiming the
other, declaring the boundary where the self diverges from and merges with the other.”49 She then
continues, “In that declaration of identity and identification, there is always loss, the loss of not
being the other and yet remaining dependent on that other for self-seeing, self-being.”50 While the
stories are being told, the audiences constantly look around, and, through their gazes, they ask of
one another ‘is this your story?’ It is this gaze, this inquiry, this need for securing oneself from
merging with these odd “Others” that makes the invisibility of the interviewees performative. But-
ler asserts, “To the extent that the “I” is secured by its sexed position, this “I” and its “position”
can be secured only by being repeatedly assumed, whereby “assumption” is not a singular act or
event, but, rather, an iterable practice.”51
The performativity of Endless Monologue and its capability in facilitating new ways of con-
structing and perceiving Iranianness should be investigated domestically and internationally. Within
the country, due to the monolithic and traditional nature of the sociopolitical and cultural dis-
courses, producing subversive performance art is crucial as it provides the community with an
opportunity to look at itself afresh. By retelling the stories of marginalized groups, Iranian artists
challenge the legitimacy of the hegemonic system that decides whose stories should become visible
and whose should remain invisible or in the margin. While becoming visible is prone to censorship,
performance art, due to its ephemerality and irreproducibility, is an ideal medium for Iranian artists
to foster new ways of intervening in the system. Without leaving any trace, performance pushes
the spectators to their limits only to encourage them to substitute their own stories with those of
the others and to build their own survival memories. It is through the act of witnessing others’
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testimonies and mixing fictional with factual truths that the audiences become a communitas with
a shared critical outlook towards the violence of the mainstream and patriarchal cultural discourse;
a discourse that its oppressive power is exposed and materialized in the subjective narrative/expe-
rience of each of the audiences. These narratives, and by extension the subversive culture, due to
their ephemerality, escape the surveillance and censorship and challenge the simulacrum of inclu-
sion and equality promulgated by the governmental agencies. As Lisa Low, in Immigrant Acts, On
Asian American Cultural Politics, contends “[Culture] is a site that shifts and marks alternatives
to the national terrain by occupying other spaces, imagining different narratives and critical his-
toriographies, and enacting practices that give rise to new forms of subjectivity and new ways of
questioning the government of human life by the national state.”52
Internationally, Endless Monologue is performative as it challenges the essentialist outlook
toward Iranians as a backward and homophobic nation. It is due to such a biased attitude that the
Western states justify their superiority and the legitimacy of their hegemonic control over the Third
World countries. A case in point, regarding the Westerners’ manipulation of news coming out of
the Middle Eastern region, is the 2005 public execution of two Iranian teenagers, Mahmood Asgari
and Ayaz Marhooni, accused of raping a thirteen-year-old boy in the holy city of Mashhad. This
execution caused a huge backlash around the world and among LGBT organizations, condemning
the fundamentalist Islamic government of Iran for their shameless act of killing homosexuals. De-
spite all the evidence presented by the Iran’s judicial system asserting that the execution was due
to the act of rape and not homosexuality, the West insisted on projecting a homophobic attitude on
the execution. The biased attacks on the execution made it impossible for civil lawyers inside the
country to question the existence of death penalty, e.g. public hanging, within the judicial system
of Iran. The execution of these two teenagers is thus an example that “inadvertently highlights
the place of the figures of the executed “gay Iranians” in today’s Western secular imagination as
referencing instances when outrage at Islam is completely justified.”53 Endless Monologue stands
at the intersection of such essentialist and biased assumptions toward Iran. The importance of this
performance piece is in its ability to not only unsettle the heteronormative cultural hegemony of
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Iran but also to destabilize the foundation established by the West for justifying its attacks on the
so-called barbaric Muslim countries. It is undeniable that the hegemonic power of Iran has a built-
in blindness toward homosexuals and women’s potentials in constructing the future of the country.
However, the very existence of this performance piece proves that, quite contrary to the Western-
ers’ assumptions, there exists some tolerance within the Islamic hegemony to initiate and propose
the re-articulation and reformation of some of the restrictions. Endless Monologue, by staging
these stories, condemns both the Iranian regime for oppressing and stigmatizing homosexuals and
the Western world who insists on portraying Iran as a place where homosexuals, due to their ab-
jectness, are publicly executed. Thus, Endless Monologue not only problematizes the oppressive
nature of the heteronormative cultural discourse of Iran but also mocks the most liberal countries
who practically have failed to provide equality for their homosexual citizens. For instance, as of
February 22nd 2017, the Trump administration rolled back the rule protecting transgender students
to use the public-school restrooms that match their sexual identity. Such orders only promulgate
hatred toward the LGBTQ community who is already marginalized and isolated in the United
States. These discriminatory acts are done under the name of democracy and freedom of choice.
So, if this is democracy, what is totalitarianism?
At its core, Endless Monologue exposes the uncomfortable truth that both Iran and the Western
states refuse to accept; domestically, acknowledging the rights of homosexuals is intertwined with
an official call for re-articulation of the Islamic laws and ideology. Internationally, recognizing the
unofficial tolerance of the Iranian regime toward homosexuality and marginalized groups requires
the re-articulation of the biased outlook feeding into depicting Iran as a barbaric, backward, and
militant Islamic state. These stories are strategically staged to show, challenge, and further repair
the abjectness associated with simulacrum of democracy, inclusivity, and equality that Iranians are
trapped within, domestically and internationally. Herein, Endless Monologue becomes metaphor
of a performative gap where not only countering the essentialist representations of Iranianness
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Chapter 3
Bewildered They Stood, Like An Empty Oath, Like a Solemn
Kurd: Mountain Language and Its Plea for Justice
Abeer Qassim Hamza al-Janabi, a fourteen-year old Iraqi girl, was raped and shot three times
in the head in her house near Baghdad by American soldiers on March 12th, 2006. Via subsequent
investigations, five U.S. soldiers, including Specialist James Barker, Pte. Jesse Spielman, Sgt.
Paul Cortez, Pts. Bryan Howard and Steven Green, were charged for planning, carrying out, and
covering up the rape and killing of Abeer and her whole family. Green, a nineteen-year-old soldier
from Midland Texas, convicted of the rape, was described by “prosecutors as predisposed to killing
Iraqis. Defense attorneys acknowledged he participated in the killings but argued he was suffering
combat stress after the death of close colleagues and did not know friend from foe.”1
Figure 3.1: Abeer Qassim Hamza al-Janabi at the age of seven, Photographer unknown.
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Green, alongside four other soldiers, after drinking whiskey and playing cards at checkpoint, in-
vaded Abeer’s house, locked up her parents and her five-year old sister in the bedroom and took
turn raping Abeer. After a while, Green went to the bedroom and shot Abeer’s mother in the
chest, her father in the head, and her little sister in the face. He then raped Abeer and shot her
three times in the head. As the epilogue to their gruesome crime, the soldiers burnt Abeer’s body
from the waist up to cover the rape. “Instead of outrage,” As Hamid Dabashi in Islamic Liberation
Theology, Resisting the Empire, argues, “the leading US legal and human rights activists and intel-
lectuals – Alan Dershowitz and Michael Ignatieff chief among them – openly, publicly, eloquently,
and with detailed analysis supported, endorsed, rationalized, theorized and sought to legalize the
systematic torturing of people – “the lesser evil,” they called it. Their civilization, they argued, was
in danger, and they had to defend it against barbarians.”2
A year before the gruesome rape of Abeer, on November 19th, 2005, a roadside bomb went
off in Haditha, northwest of Baghdad, and killed “20-year-old Lance Corp Miguel ("TJ") Terrazas,
driving one of the four Humvee vehicles on patrol, injuring two other marines.”3 In a statement,
the U.S. military reported the incident mentioning the death of a U.S. marine alongside of fifteen
other civilians. While the UN and the international journalists took the U.S. military statement as
a matter of fact, a local journalist, Taher Thabet al-Hadithi, went to the scene and shot footage
contradicting the U.S. military statement. Mr. Hidithi’s footage captures women and children
brutally shot and murdered in their own homes, not because of a “blasted roadside bomb” but by
direct bullets. Following further investigations, it became apparent that a band of U.S. marines
went on a killing rampage, moving from one home to another, to shoot and kill civilians without
a legitimate reason; civilians who were supposed to be liberated from the tyranny of their dictator,
Saddam Hussein, by the U.S.- led war on terror.
56
Figure 3.2: Iraqi Civilians who were shot on 19 November, 2005 during the Haditha Massacre, Courtesy of The New
York Times, taken by Lucian Read
As Dabashi contends,
Iraqi eyewitnesses of the massacre reported to Iraqi authorities the details of how
the US troops entered their houses and began indiscriminately killing entire families.
“They knocked at our front door,” one eyewitness reported, “and my father went to
open it. They shot him dead from behind the door and then they shot him again. Then
one American soldier came in and shot at us all. I pretended to be dead and he didn’t
notice me.” Children as young as two years and as old as 14 were among the victims
of the massacre. In an adjacent house yet another child and his 70-year-old grandfa-
ther were shot dead. Four brothers in the same family, aged from 24 to 41 were shot
dead. “Eyewitnesses said they were forced into a wardrobe and shot.” This is not all:
“Outside in the street, US troops are said to have gunned down four students and a
taxi driver they had stopped at a roadblock set up after the bombing.” Colonel Stewart
Navarre of the US army finally admitted on December 21, 2006, that “the reporting of
the incident up the chain command was inaccurate and untimely.”4
The repetitive appearance of images depicting Muslims’ lifeless bodies has become one of the
signatures of the “War on Terror;” a war that did everything except emancipating Iraqi, Afghan,
Kurd, Turk, and Syrian civilians from the dictatorship of their leaders and the humanistic threat
imposed on their states by so called radical “Islamist” terrorist groups. The attempts by the First
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World countries to spread democracy and human rights in the Middle East have historically been
proven to be no more than an excuse for further war crimes in the region; a region that was never
officially conquered by any of the white colonizers and consequently stood as a strong enough
geopolitical power (capable of) endangering the hegemonic presence of the West, especially that of
the United States. Herein, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Islam, as Edward Said, in Covering
Islam, How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, argues, sig-
nificantly became a discourse which “For the right, [represented] barbarism; for the left, medieval
theocracy; for the center, a kind of distasteful exoticism.”5 Perpetuating such racially charged
outlooks in masterminding tactics such as the launch of “War on Terror” or issuing sanctions on
countries like Iran, depict Muslims as citizens incapable of acting individually and secularly. In
other words, Muslims will always be Muslims identified and categorized as a single community
prone to radicalization and a posing threat to Western civilization.i Thus, post 9/11, and in the
context of “War on Terror,” the images of lifeless Muslim bodies in media outlets never was used
to represent individuals whose lives have been taken violently; they were represented as an image
of a dangerous foe whose annihilation is the United States humanistic duty.
It is almost impossible to look at what has happened in Haditha and not think of “PinkVile,”
Vietnam where Lt. William L. Calley Jr., known as “Rusty,” in March of 1968 deliberately mur-
dered at least one hundred and nine Vietnamese civilians. Instead of an outrage, “Colonel George
S. Patton III – son of the Patton – sent out a Christmas card reading “Peace on Earth” with pho-
iSuch an outlook stands in sharp contrast with how calamities such as the 1995 bombing of the Federal Building
in Oklahoma City is depicted and discussed in the United States. As JonathanK. Stubbsl, in Bottom Rung of America’s
Race Ladder, argues, “governmental law enforcement personnel did not create a racial profile of individuals like Tim-
othy McVeigh, and engage in widespread arrests of disgruntled white males who perceived themselves to have axes
to grind with the American government. Professor Leti Volpp described the situation well: The Timothy McVeigh
analogy helps clarify the strangeness of the present moment. Under the logic of profiling all people who look like ter-
rorists under the "Middle Eastern" stereotype, all whites should have been subjected to stops, detentions, and searches
after the Oklahoma City bombing and the identification of McVeigh as the prime suspect. This did not happen because
Timothy McVeigh did not produce a discourse about good whites and bad whites, because we think of him as an
individual deviant, a bad actor. We do not think of his actions as representative of an entire racial group. This is part
and parcel of how racial subordination functions, to understand nonwhites as directed by group-based determinism but
whites as individuals. Racial profiling also did not happen because, as a white man, Timothy McVeigh was seen by
many as one of "us"—as the New York Times editorialized at that time, there was "sickening evidence that the enemy
was not some foreign power, but one within ourselves.” For further reading please refer to Bottom Rung of America’s
Race Ladder, After the September 1 Catastrophe are American Muslims Becoming America’s New N. . . s? Journal of
Law & Religion, Vol. XIX, 19 J. L. & Religion 115 2003-2004 by JonathanK. Stubbsl.
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tographs of “dismembered Viet Cong soldiers stacked in a neat pile.””6 And, it is also very difficult
to look at the bodies of Viet Cong soldiers piled upon one another and not to remember the Abu
Ghraib photos where naked Iraqi inmates were stacked on top of each other in the form of a pyra-
mid.ii Again, instead of an outrage, Rumsfeld, on May 4th, 2004, when asked about the photos,
contended, ““Oh, I’m not one for instant history.””7 This is not an instant history; othering, tortur-
ing, and cold bloodedly killing those who have tried to de-colonize and to free themselves from
the grip of U.S. imperialist adventurism is a longstanding and arduous tradition.
Investigating the outcomes of the U.S. imperial proclivities in the Middle East, this chapter
demonstrates the fallacies associated with whitewashed ideologies supporting the invasion of the
Middle Eastern countries under the justification of the “War on Terror.”iii This chapter further
argues that the Middle Eastern countries, including Iran as one of the most stable states in the
region, are not in the need of intervention by imperialist powers to fix their “problems.” While it is
imperative to criticize the shortcomings of Islamic regimes’ policies such as Iran, it is also crucial
to examine the U.S. neoconservative approach to the calamities of the Islamic states. If the “War
on Terror” was launched to defeat and block warmongering of a few radical “Islamic” groups such
as Al Qaeda or ISIS, then why did a vast majority of Muslim nations, including Iranians, became
the United States’ most dangerous nemesis and new global enemies?iv Equating all Muslims to a
iiSeymour M. Hersh in Chain of Command, The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, chronicles the events leading to
the publication of Abu Ghraib photos. In one detailed description, he asserts, “In one photograph, Private England, a
cigarettes dangling from her mouth, is giving a jaunty thumbs-up sign and pointing at the genitals of a young Iraqi,
who is naked except for a sandbag over his head, as he masturbates. Three other hooded and naked Iraqi prisoners are
shown, hands reflexively crossed over their genitals. A fifth prisoner has his hand at his sides. In another, England
stands arm in arm with Specialist Graner; both are grinning and giving the thumbs-up behind a cluster of perhaps
seven naked Iraqis, knees bent, piled clumsily on top of each other in a pyramid. There is another photograph of a
cluster of naked prisoners, again piled in a pyramid. Near them stands Graner, smiling, his arms crossed; Specialist
Sabrina Harman stands in front of him, bending over, and she, too, is smiling. Then, there is another cluster of
hooded bodies, with a female soldier standing in front, taking photographs. Yet another photograph shows a kneeling,
naked, unhooded male prisoner, head momentarily turned away from the camera, posed to make it appear that he is
performing oral sex on another male prisoner, who is naked and hooded.” (P. 23)
iii“War on Terror” was a term used by George W. Bush following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack.
ivIt is of paramount important that the U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East in general and Iran in particular
gets investigated in the context of the long history of U.S-Iran hostile relationship started with CIA engineered coup
in 1953. In February of 1949, Shah, with justification of surviving an assassination plot, closed all the newspapers
critical of his domestic and foreign policies. He also detained, prisoned, and exiled most of the oppositional voices.
His clampdowns resulted in a severe backlash and led clerical, secular, and elitist leaderships to start playing a key role
in structuring the protests against the government’s suppressive actions. The formation of National Front headed by
Mohammad Mosaddeq and Ayatollah Kashani was one of the outcomes of such attempts. National Front represented
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few radical terrorists who have taken Islam hostage will criminalize and depoliticize the uprising
of groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and reformist party in Iran who are resisting the further
colonization of their countries. Parallel to restoring and safeguarding their states independence,
countries like Iran are heavily involved in stopping the development of radical Islamic groups
including ISIS in Syria and Iraq. However, broadcasting such anti-terrorist attempts initiated and
carried by Iran is counter-intuitive to a Western, whitewashed, perception of the country’s clerical
regime.v
To examine these questions, this chapter uses a production of Mountain Language, written
by Harold Pinter and staged by Ali Akbar Alizad, the head of 84Theatre Company, in Tehran,
“predominantly bazaar middle class, and a variety of secular, nationalistic, and social democratic parties, articulating
mainly the interest of the salaried middle class.” What made the formation of National Front significant, in addition
to the presence of the clerical leadership in the political scene, was the success of Mosaddeq and Kashani in mobiliz-
ing the university students and elites to push for free press and independent oil industry. As the protests continued,
Shah with the hope of easing the oppositional front’s high temper, appointed Mosaddeq as his prime minister. This
appointment had multiple consequences. On the one hand, Mosaddeq nationalized Iran’s oil and cut out the Britan-
nia’s domination on the industry, an act that greatly damaged Shah’s international status. On the other hand, due
to Mosaddeq’s growing power and popularity, religious leaders notably Ayatollah Kashani, withdrew their supports
for Mosaddeq and for National Front with the perception that Mosaddeq was pursuing a socialist revolution. Shah,
by taking advantage of this division in National Front, found a perfect opportunity for removal of Mosaddeq from
the office. Eventually in 1953, with the help of CIA, Shah planned a coup d’etat and overthrew Mosaddeq. At first
glance, it may appear that the overthrowing of Mosaddeq worked in favor of the Shah, however, a closer considera-
tion makes it obvious that the winner of this power struggle was actually a clerical front who, by fracturing National
Front, provided a platform for itself to emerge as a sole savior of Iran’s crippling sociopolitical condition. The Coup
and its aftermath clamped down climaxed in the 1978-79 Islamic Revolution that, As Dabashi in Brown Skin, White
Masks argues, “became a thorn in the side of American and Israeli militarism, with the potential for spreading its
ideology like wildfire. During the Reagan administration (1981–89), the United States and its European and regional
allies (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Israel in particular) created bumper zones on either side of the Islamic Republic,
overseen by the Wahabi-inspired Taliban to its east and Saddam Hussein to its west. The Taliban succeeded in ex-
pelling the Soviets from Afghanistan and in preventing the spread of the Shi’i-inspired Iranian revolution to Central
Asia. Saddam Hussein did the same (likewise heavily supported by the US and its allies) by engaging Iran in a war
that lasted eight terrible years (1980–88), with Muslims murdering Muslims by the tens of thousands, much to the
satisfaction of such observers as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who quipped, “It’s a pity both sides can’t
lose”. The two Frankensteins the US created—Mullah Omar in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq—succeeded
at their assigned tasks, but they came back to haunt their creators. Saddam Hussein had scarcely finished battling Iran
when he turned the same weapons and intelligence that the US and its allies had put at his disposal on Kuwait; the
Taliban that the Reagan administration had trained (through Pakistan) and financed (through Saudi Arabia) became the
host of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, whose wave of reported terrorist attacks (there is no way to verify the charges)
against the United States and its interests ranged from Nairobi, Kenya (1998) and Dar as-Salam, Tanzania (1998), to
the World Trade Center (1993 and 2001).
vDuring the month of November, 2017, the president of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, and Iraqi Prime Minister both
declared the total defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Among the silence of mainstream media, only a handful of news
outlets such as Business Insider or Huffington Post ran an article regarding such an important victory in the Middle
Eastern region. For further reading please visit, http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-military-defeat-
iraq-syria-2017-11.
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Iran. This production demonstrates one of the moments where the “Orient” comes to terms with
the image that is projected upon it not only by its own governmental agencies but also by the
imperialist powers. I argue that a subversive theatre production such as Mountain Language can
de-initiate its spectators through the reenactment of torture and violence. The process of initiation
and de-initiation of spectators during the production of Mountain Language is examined within
concepts such as disposability of Muslim body, the materiality of wounding, the use of torture as a
complex political practice, and self-(de)regulation through memory. Alizad’s staging of Mountain
Language is based upon the bare display of torture, its prevalent use within the country, and its
normalcy within Muslims’ collective memory. It is important to examine the performativity of
this production not only within the country, where the fear of torture is deeply enmeshed in the
collective memory of Iranians, but also from outside, where the Muslim body has become a regular
site for imperialists to cite and mark their hegemonic superiority.
Daniel Martinez HoSang, in Racial Formation in the Twenty-First Century, proposes a critical
and less explored question regarding Omi and Winant’s racial formation theory by asking “How
might racial formation theory effectively engage issues of indigeneity, war making, and settler
colonialism?”8 In response, by criticizing the ideology of neoliberal and U.S.’s Left towards the
issue of racism, HoSang contends that the Left political party has a built-in blindness towards the
mechanism of new racial discourse and as a result it is unable to mount an effective anti-racist
campaign.9 When applying racial formation theory as adapted by HoSang to the perspective of
how Iranians are racialized from a U.S. standpoint, one finds that examples of blindness, war mak-
ing, and settler colonialism are ample; after a launch of “War on Terror” and creating a political
vacuum in the region, endemic in empowering radical groups such as ISIS, the Obama adminis-
tration was faced with a threat labeled as “nuclear Iran.” While the Obama administration insisted
on Iran’s tendency to violate human rights, under the pressure of Israeli and Saudi lobbyists, the
administration pressed the Iranian government to give up their nuclear exploration. In the face of
sanctions’ failure, the Obama administration renewed its attempts to open diplomatic negotiations
with Iranian representatives. Parallel to this negotiation, a crisis in Syria climaxed with interna-
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tional claims of Bashar Assad’s genocide against his own people. The United States, a country that
has always introduced itself as a watchdog of human rights in the region, with the fear of annoying
the Iranian government and consequently losing the opportunity of reaching a diplomatic agree-
ment on the U.S.-Iran nuclear standoff, did not say or do anything about Assad’s war crime against
his own people. If the clerical regime of Iran is being counted as a foremost supporter of terrorism
in the region, then why were diplomatic negotiation prioritized to calamities of Syria? And if the
U.S. claims of focusing its attempt on relieving the plight of people living under dictatorship, such
as Asad’s regime, then why did not a single person in the Obama administration utter a word re-
garding the Syrian genocide during Iran’s negotiation? And why did the International world close
its doors to the Syrian refugees who escaped their country as their only viable way of living?
Omi and Winant in their landmark book, Racial Formation in the United States From the
1960s to the 1990s, argue that racial formation should be understood “as an unstable and “de-
centered” complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle.”10 As
HoSang builds on their argument to consider war making as a contingent factor that limits U.S.
anti-racist practice, one can deduct that the United States’ concern has never been the violation of
human rights by Islamic states or the so-called development of weapons of mass destruction by its
leaders. The issue provoking the most concern and action by the United States has always been
who is going to be the hegemonic power in the region and how the geopolitical situation of the U.S.
allies is going to be impacted by potential power shifts in the region.vi In other words, in order
for U.S. allies to safeguard their superior status in the region, the rest of the Muslim nations easily
and without offering any explanation can become the new U.S./global nemesis. That is why Iraqi
civilians get locked up in Abu Ghraib, Iranians get banned from entering the U.S. and Palestinians
are colonized by Israeli army without being allowed to fight back.
viAs Daniel Pipes, who was nominated by the president George W Bush for the board of directors of the U.S.
Institute of Peace, argues, “Troublemaking by Islamists on U.S. territory pales, however, in comparison to the danger
they pose in the Middle East; their seizure of power in just a few cantons there would likely create a new political
order in the region, with disastrous consequences. Israel would probably face a return to its unhappy condition of days
past, beleaguered by terrorism and surrounded by enemy states. Civil unrest in oil-producing regions could lead to
a dramatic run-up in the cost of energy. Rogue states, already numerous in the Middle East(Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan,
Libya), would multiply, leading to arms races, more international terrorism, and wars, lots of wars.” For further reading
please refer to Militant Islam Reaches America published by W. W. Norton & Company in 2002.
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In the context of such a complex political climate in the Middle Eastern region, there are
questions needed to be asked including but not limited to: When any resistance of Middle East
against imperialist adventurism and warmongering of the West is going to be used as a proof of
criminality and barbarity of Muslims, then how the de-colonization of the region is possible? While
the photos of naked Iraqi inmates is strategically circulated only for Muslims to internalize their
inferiority, what can one do to resist the degeneration and desubjection of his/her/their identity?
While there exists a myriad of ways of answering these questions, Alizad proposed one of the
most effective when he staged the production of Mountain Language with its emphatic display of
torture and its role in (re)shaping the Iranians’ collective perception of their identity. By restoring
faith in its spectators, Mountain Language attempts to undo years of de-subjection that Iranians
has suffered due to the oxymoronic sociopolitical conditions within and without the country. Thus,
in what follows, this chapter first investigates the chain of events leading up to the production of
Mountain Language at the Molavi Theatre, in Tehran Iran, in October 2016. Further, this chapter
explores the performativity of staging torture in de-initiating its audience from the habit of self-
regulation.
While this chapter fully acknowledged the problems of documenting a performance piece by
referring to Peggy Phelan definition of performance as “representation without reproduction,” it
offers a two-fold argument: on one hand, this chapter argues that a subversive theatre movement
focused on the theme of torture and the misusing of power does exist in Iran and its performativity
is quite effective among the audience. On the other hand, it reveals the West’s wrong depiction
of Muslims as violent and barbaric and devoid of any knowledge and intelligence. Thus, while
this chapter addresses the problems of documenting a performance, it argues that, in the context
of Muslim resistance movement, such documentation is a necessity as it can become a political
means for self-(de) regulation and de-initiation of already ritualized and demarcated brown bodies.
Catherin Bell, in Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice contends, “The body is always conditioned by
and responsive to a specific context. Hence, ritualization, as the production of a ritualized agent
via the interaction of a body within a structured and structuring environment, always takes place
63
within a larger and very immediate sociocultural situation.”11 As I argue in the introduction, if the
Islamic power structure and Western imperialism have constructed a societal environment within
which people unconsciously start to internalize censorship and oppression, the contemporary art
movement seeks to deconstruct such an environment and then reconstruct it again. Such a process
is possible only by de-initiating audiences from the habit of thinking of oneself as an oppressed
and inferior. This is what ritualized bodies do which is producing wholly new conscious bodies
capable of passing through the liminal stage and restructuring the world anew.
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Mountain Language and Its Plea for Justice
Figure 3.3: The Police, Production Photo by Rana Esfandiary, the Black Box theatre of the Film and Theatre Depart-
ment, Art University of Tehran, Iran, December 12, 2009.
Prior to staging The Mountain Language, Alizad had started to think of representing violence
as a communicative means for signifying the existence of oppression and censorship within the
Middle Eastern countries including Iran. Such a process started with the production of The Police,
written by Polish playwright Slawomir Mrozek in 1958 and adapted by Alizad for its first premier
in Iran in 2009. The Police narrates the story of the last political prisoner who abandons his oppo-
sition to the regime and declares his readiness to join and serve the government and the country’s
beloved Infant King and his Uncle the Regent. The Chief of Police, while suspicious, accepts the
prisoner’s redemption and set him free after ten years of interrogation and torture. Upon releas-
ing the last prisoner, the Chief of Police, out of pure boredom, decides to recruit one of his own
sergeants to play the role of a democracy-seeking revolutionary. He chooses his most loyal rank,
the Police Sergeant who had been tirelessly serving the government and its Infant King. In order
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to convince the public of the sergeant’s change of heart, the chief of police persuades him to throw
a bomb at the General. Manipulated by the Chief of Police and the Generals’ aid-de-camp, the
Sergeant encounters an identity crisis and by the end of the play he turns into a true rebel and an
advocate of freedom.
Daniel Gerould, in The Mrozek Reader, contends “[Mrozek’s] stories and plays gave audi-
ences a way of laughing both at the regime and at themselves as victims of the system. It was the
self-ironic shared laughter of the abused acknowledging their own comical helplessness and loss of
dignity in the face of the daily absurdity of their lives.”12 Mrozek’s sharp criticism of the false and
absurd nature of totalitarianism practiced in his own country as well as the East Europe, attracted
the attention of the head of the 84 Theatre Company, Ali Akbar Alizad who in addition to teaching
script analysis and playwriting in Art University of Tehran was engaged in theater as a director
and dramaturge since 1991. Finding the play an appropriate means for articulating and criticizing
the sociopolitical issues of the country, Alizad staged the show for the first time, as part of the 12th
International Student Festival, in Tehran, Iran, in May of 2009. “We were a month away from the
presidential election and I didn’t have any hopes for staging The Police due to its highly political
nature,”13 Alizad explains. To his surprise, however, permission was issued by the Ministry of
Culture and Islamic Guidance to mount the show at the festival. “The audiences’ feedback was
both overwhelmingly thrilling and frightening. They decoded the production in a highly political
manner, which was above and beyond my expectations.”14
The production of The Police coincided with the disputed 2009 presidential election in Iran
when criticism of Ahmadinejad’s administration reached its highest level. Upon declaring Ah-
madinejad as the projected winner of the election, supporters of Mir Hussein Moussavi, a candi-
date who had openly opposed and publicly criticized Ahmadinejad during campaign period, spilled
into the streets and requested a recount. The more the regime tried to bring the situation under its
control, the more rumors regarding the use of torture and sexual abuse within the juridical sys-
tem intensified. Fact or fiction, such narratives regarding the existence of torture materialized the
hegemonic power of the regime and “becomes part of the public image of the state.”15 Alizad’s
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production of The Police tapped into the sensitive issue of open secrecy of torture and its suppos-
edly prevalent use within the judiciary system where prisoners were said to be water boarded or
sexually abused only to give a desirable confession. Through re-enactment of torture, e.g., water
boarding a political prisoner at the opening of the show and in the bare view of audiences, Alizad
sought to problematize the promulgation and the consumption of political violence as a normative
approach to regulate the communal behavior of the society. Alizad believed that witnessing such
a shockingly open and poignant staging of torture could be an effective means in forcing the com-
munity to see itself as a social body; a community that is (secretly) marked by the violence of the
hegemonic power and has lost its individual and collective identity.
Figure 3.4: The Police, Production Photo by Rana Esfandiary, the Black Box theatre of the Film and Theatre Depart-
ment, Art University of Tehran, Iran, December 12, 2009.
Since too many direct displays of torture indicative of promulgating of torture within the
society would become costly for Alizad and his company, he astutely incorporated the language of
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ritual, e.g. Taziyeh’s passion play, as a communicative means to signify “the hidden links between
culture and power.”16 Taziyeh is a signature ritual of the month of Muharram and it commemorates
the battle of Karbala where Imam Hussein, Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, and his seventy-two
comrades were brutally slaughtered as they refused to take the oath of allegiance with Yazid, a
Sunni caliphate.vii As Catherin Bell, in Ritual Perspective and Dimension, contends,
Unlike the Sunni majority, festivals are very important among the Shi’ah, particularly
those of Muharram that commemorate the death of Husayn. In shi’i communities
in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and India, men and women observe this mourning period by
wearing dark, unornamented clothing and attending services. Processions of devotees
beat their breasts, weeping and wailing, to evoke the sufferings of Husayn and his
mother, Fatima. Passion plays (taziya) dramatically reenact the Karbala’ battle itself
with unusual intensity. Indeed, for the Shi’ah such ceremonies of “remembrance and
mourning” are thought to atone for one’s sins, earn entry into paradise, and ultimately
bring about the final rectification of history.17
Alizad used the ritual of Taziyeh not only to criticize the misuse of power as a regulatory means
but also to historicize the existence of torture practiced by the country’s hegemonic powers (es-
pecially during Pahlavi and Qajar dynasty and their following regimes) and the West within the
Iranians’ collective memory for the past 200 years. Through the use of Taziyeh, Alizad staged
torture as a practice that “rests on a bed of quotidian ritualizations that utilize physical pain, verbal
abuse, humiliation, and abjection, not only to demonstrate but also to inscribe power relations.”18
In order to make this statement grounded, Alizad incorporated various key elements of Taziyeh
including its colored symbolism and costume tradition.viii For the character of the General, a sex-
ist, brainless, and clownish high rank military individual, Alizad, instead of attiring the actor in a
military uniform, chose the traditional Tazieh’s red costume. As Alizad contends, “I was looking
viiFor Shi’i minority, Karbala is as important as Mecca since it symbolizes the rightful succession of power from
Prophet Muhammad to his grandson rather than to a Sunni Caliph. Ta’ziyeh, as Hamid Dabashi in “Tazieyeh as
Theatre of Protest,” argues, “remembers and reenacts a doomed battle between a small band of revolutionaries and
an entrenched and deeply corrupt political power. There is a universality to the battle of Karbala that can easily be
extrapolated to include any small band of revolutionaries fighting against any entrenched political power. Ta’ziyeh,
in effect, provides revolutionaries across time and space with the opportunity to change the course of history, as it
was unjustly determined in the battle of Karbala." For Further reading please refer to Tazieyeh as Theatre of Protest,
published by TDR (1988-) Vol. 49, No. 4.
viiiTaziyeh is a passion play through which the battle of Karbala is being retold. Simplicity and color symbolism is
among its foremost signatures where Hussein and his comrades always wear green and Yazid’s army wears red.
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for something that could help audiences to immediately recognize the personality of the General
as a dictator and ruthless character. I was not able to use contemporary costume since it would
become too revealing.”19 Also, during his 2009 presidential campaign, Ahmadinejad had chosen
red as his signature campaign color, so, without directly mentioning it, the whole violence and con-
spiracy embedded in the production of The Police was contextualized within the country’s political
turmoil.
Figure 3.5: The Police, Production Photo by Rana Esfandiary, the Black Box theatre of the Film and Theatre Depart-
ment, Art University of Tehran, Iran, December 12, 2009.
However, glancing over the General’s costume made it obvious that the director finally decided
to incorporate contemporary elements as he combined the traditional Taziyeh attire with modern
props. “I wanted to show that our country had suffered from similar false ideology for at least the
past two hundred years. That is why I decided to use Tazieh’s costume with modern accessories
such as contemporary black military boots or medals.”20 The production of The Police was can-
celed by the Art University administration office only after two performances and Alizad never got
the chance to revisit it in the subsequent years.
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After The Police, Alizad staged Mountain Language at Tehran’s Molavi Hall, a venue known
for its less commercially oriented productions, in May of 2010 and as part of the 13th International
University Theatre Festival. Mountain Language narrated the story of a group of women waiting
outside the state’s prison to visit their loved ones. Forbidden to speak their native language, the
sergeant reminds the women that their language is dead and that they are obliged to speak the
language of the capital. Before letting these women into the prison, by calling their sons, husbands,
and fathers ‘shithouses,’ the Sergeant and the Officer keep abusing the women sexually, physically,
and mentally. While inside the prison, an old mother who does not know the language of the
capital, thrilled by seeing her son, starts to speak with him in their forbidden language. The guards,
furious by her disobedience, beat and kill the mother and the son both.
In order to simulate the Iranian society’s turmoil after the 2009 presidential election on the
stage, “Alizad’s production [opened] with a group of women dressed in black, each carrying an
umbrella, walking at snail’s pace to reach the prison walls where they wait in silence to visit their
sons, brother, fathers, and husbands.”21 The scene was a reminder of May 17th, 2010, when the
families of the political prisoners gathered outside of the Evin prison, located on the northwestern
of Tehran, and signed a statement asserting,
For years we believed that the judiciary system is a place where the oppressed can turn
to for justice and where the ruthless are brought to justice. However, with the passing
of time, our disappointments in the judiciary system have risen and now our only hope
and refuge is in God.22
The image of women in black repeated itself at the conclusion of Mountain Language where Al-
izad choreographed them to gather around the son’s and the mother’s bloody bodies and to lift
their heads slowly and to face the audience directly until the lights gradually fades out.23 The
lasting image of women staring at the audience could potentially be interpreted as a necessity of
acknowledging and addressing the existence of torture and its effect in regulating the society and
the community’s collective identity.
The 2010 staging of Mountain Language was limited to only few performances within the
International University Theatre Festival. A six-year gap was the break that Alizad took before
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going back to Mountain Language as he thought the timing in 2016 was suitable for re-staging
the play and depicting the violence, torture, and terror enmeshed with and intensified in Iranians’
psyches.
Figure 3.6: Mountain Language, Production Photo courtesy of Iran Theatre Website, Molavi Theatre, Tehran, Iran,
October, 2016.
For the second staging of Mountain Language in October of 2016, Alizad coupled Pinter’s play
with the third episode of Martine Crimp’s Attempts on Her Life, “Faith in ourselves,” only to
emphasize the peculiar relationship between language, (in)audibility, and power hierarchy within
the society. While choosing the works of notable European playwrights such as Crimp and Pinter
could potentially contradict and undermine Alizad’s intention in criticizing the political violence
imposed on Iranians from within and without the country, not overtly political nature of these plays
assisted him to surmount the difficulty of obtaining permission and escaping further censorship for
staging his production. In order to fully realize his concept within these plays, Alizad utilized a
directing style that he had developed during the rehearsals of The House of Bernarda Alba, staged
at Tehran’s Entezami Theatre in 2013. Regarding his directing style as Alizad explained himself,
We would start rehearsing a scene by a cold reading from the text. Then the process of
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realizing and visualizing the scene through images would start. We narrated the scene
with bodies, facial expressions, movements, and gestures. We would keep repeating
the process many times until I could ensure that the silent images were capable of
narrating the story without the need for words.24
It was only after ensuring a visual effectiveness for each scene that Alizad would start adding di-
alogue to his work. For building visually and compositionally appealing scenes during the Moun-
tain Language rehearsal process, Alizad centered his inspiration on German paintings, particularly
those etching by Käthe Kollwitz.ix By doing so, Alizad attempted to aestheticize the culture of
torture and stage it as a series of appealing moments. As Tobin Siebers, in The Return to Ritual:
Violence and Art in the Media Age, argues:
However, trauma art pushes these insights one step further by insisting that violence
is readable increasingly as a signifier not only of culture but of aesthetic culture. The
aesthetic representation of violence replays the idea of culture with an added dimen-
sion, serving both as the principal sign of the “cultural” and as a way of transforming
what “culture” means.25
ixA technique in printmaking which is etching on the surface of a metal sensitive to acid.
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Figure 3.7: Mountain Language, photographer unknown, Production Photo courtesy of Alizad Molavi Theatre, Tehran,
Iran, October, 2016.
In his interview with Tasnim News, the Iranian online news agency, Alizad contends, “Today is
not a time to talk about politics with irony; there is no irony in politics, not anymore.”26 Following
such an ideology, the re-enactment of torture and violence in Mountain Language turns into a
strategic means to foreground the political statement of the production which was/is the imbalanced
power relation between the oppressor and the oppressed. From the opening moment, Mountain
Language exhibits a raw display of torture. One example includes a long display of a prisoner
being beaten by guards while one of the guards sips from a jar of blood and then spits it back in the
face of a young male inmate. Herein, torture is re-enacted not only as an assault on individuals but
also as a disciplinary tool against the society. As William T. Cavanaugh, in Torture And Eucharist,
Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ, argues:
Torture does not uncover and penalize a certain type of discourse rather creates a dis-
course of its own and uses it to realize the states’ claim to power over the bodies of its
citizen. Torture plays out the dream of a certain kind of state, the production of a type
of power/knowledge which I will call the imagination of state. To speak of imagina-
tion is not, of course, to imply that state power is “merely imaginary,” a disembodied
thought. The imagination of the state has a tremendous power to discipline bodies, to
habituate them and script them into a drama of its own making.27
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Figure 3.8: Mountain Language, photographer unknown, Molavi Theatre, Tehran, Iran, October, 2016.
In Alizad’s Mountain Language, the power dynamic between the torturers and the tortured
is also foregrounded by the use of language/silence, audibility/inaudibility, and mobility/immobil-
ity. As Alizad argues in his interview, “Language becomes a political means for indicating the
amount of power and privilege that each character is entitled to have in a society.”28 In Mountain
Language, while those women capable of only speaking in their forbidden language are dressed in
dark colors and are immobile, the young woman knowing the language of capital is attired in red
and empowered to move freely across the stage. In one instance, the young woman, sensing the
fear and lack of courage for action by other visitors, approaches one of the officers and introduces
herself and her husband as intellectuals. The Officer, upon examining their papers, informs the
sergeant:
He doesn’t come from the mountain. He’s in the wrong batch.
Sergeant: So is she. She looks like a fucking intellectual to me.
Officer: But you said her arse wobbled.
Sergeant: Intellectual arses wobble the best.29
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After this exchange, the Officer slaps the young woman which not only silences her but also lim-
its her range of movements and mobility. As Alizad asserts, “language, in Mountain Language,
contains everything that is regarded as taboo in the sociopolitical context of the country. In such so-
ciety, any alternative language is banned, subjectivity is banned, freedom and mobility is restricted,
and bodies are regulated.”30 In such an environment those incapable of adjusting themselves to the
rules and regulation of the capital, would become the subject of torture and physical pain. And
as William T. Cavanaugh contends, “Those in great pain are reduced to inarticulate screams and
moans, or words which convey little of the actual experience of pain (“throbbing,” “stabbing,”
burning”).”31 Either the tortured/the outcast will conform or his/her/their moans will mirror the
torturer’s absolute superiority. That is why in Alizad’s production, those who are tortured scream
silently and fall quietly. They refuse to lend their individual and collective voices to the mega-
phones of power structure that amplifies the pain of the tortured for disciplining the rest.
Thinking of torture as a tool capable of restructuring the identity of its victim, individual
or communal, can be considered as an initiation process where the wounds, pains, and marks
on the tortured bodies materialize itself in establishing a new understanding of power hierarchy
and its absolute superiority over its masses.x Herein, the practice/existence of torture acts as a
rite of passage where imaginary concepts such as State’s power get transformed from “physical
inevitabilities into cultural regularities.”32 With such a conceptualization, torture can be defined
as part of ritual family where ritual is defined as an action, “[dramatizing] the collective ideas by
which a given community imagines its communal status, because rituals give these ideas material
form.”33 If torture is considered as a ritualistic act, staging violence in a formalized manner and
within a specific time-space context, then displaying it on stage of a theatre can be looked upon as a
revered ritual/rite of passage aiming to de-initiate spectators into conscious states of (dis)obedience
characterized by not total submission and not-not total freedom. Therefore, the production of
xWilliam T. Cavanaugh theorizes torture as a kind of “perverted liturgy, a ritual act which organize bodies in the
society into a collective performance, not of true community, but of an atomized aggregate of mutually suspicious
individuals. Just as liturgy is not a merely “spiritual” formation which then must be applied to the physical world,
torture is not a merely physical assault on bodies but a formation of a social imagination. To speak of the imagination
does not imply unreal fantasy. As I use the term, the “social imagination” of a group is that vision which organizes the
members into a set of coherent performances, and which is constantly reconstructed by those performances.”
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Mountain Language constructs a liminal space, where the spectators witness the sociopolitical
dimension of practicing torture and its effects in altering their self-understanding of their individual
and communal characters.xi
While the Mountain Language turns the display of ritualized torture into a reversed rite of
passage for its spectators inside the country, its performativity is quite different for those who read
and document the work from the outside. In one of the scenes, while a brutal torturing act is
being unfolded in the background, one of the officers starts to sing Perfect Day by Lou Reed in the
foreground:
xiVictor Turner in his book, From Ritual to Theatre, The Human Seriousness of Play, defines liminal stage as a
“mode of redress, which always contained at least the germ of self-reflexivity, a public way of assessing our social
behavior has moved out of the domains of law and religion into those of the various arts. By means of such genres
as theatre, including puppetry and shadow theatre, dance drama, and professional story-telling, performances are
presented which probe a community’s weakness, call its leaders to account, desacralize its most cherished values
and beliefs, portray its characteristic conflicts and suggest remedies for them, and generally take stick of its current
situation in the known “world.”
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Figure 3.9: Mountain Language, photographer unknown, Molavi Theatre, Tehran, Iran, October, 2016.
Just a perfect day
Feed animals in the zoo
Then later
A movie, too, and then home
Just a perfect day
You made me forget myself
I thought I was
Someone else, someone good 34
It is almost inevitable to be a Muslim spectator/reader, looking at this photo and listening to the
song, and not to think of Abu Ghraib where torturing the Iraqi inmates turned into a racist porno-
graphic photo-shoot session by a handful of American soldiers. The sexualized nature of the
tortures was in fact an extra racial tool utilized by American soldiers to reiterate the stereotypes
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associated with Muslims and their supposedly homophobic attitude. According to the testimonies
of one of the witnesses, Specialist Matthew Wisdom, on April 9th 2004, after delivering seven
hooded and handcuffed Iraqi inmates to Abu Ghraib, “saw two naked detainees, one masturbating
to another kneeling with its mouth open.”35 He then continues, “I thought I should just get out of
there. I didn’t think it was right. . . I saw SSG Fredrick walking towards me and he said, “Look
what these animals do when you leave them alone for two seconds.” I heard PFC England shout
out, “He’s getting hard.””36 In Abu Ghraib incident, unknown bodies of tortured Iraqis’ inmates
are displayed to construct the image of America as the single most powerful First World country.
There is no shame in making public the private torture of Iraqis inmates. No matter how brutal and
crude the images are the afterimage burnt into the individual and the collective Muslim psyches
are among the desired outcomes. As Werner Binder et al. argues, “At Abu Ghraib it was not only
a gesture of domination dividing torturer from victims, but also a display of power, first of all to
the torturers themselves, and secondarily to a generalized audience embodied in the camera.”37
In Mountain Language the procession of torture, while a delightful song such as Perfect Day
is sung, turns into a sadistic comedy serving many goals except obtaining information necessary
for maintaining the safety of the State and its citizens. As this chapter argues, it is of a paramount
importance that productions such as Mountain Language get documented and circulated not only
because of their subversive natures, within their immediate geopolitical context, but also because
of their capabilities in addressing the atrocities done by First World powers under the justification
of spreading freedom and democracy among the so-called less civilized nations of the Middle
Eastern region. Herein, Mountain Language, in the hands of Alizad’s, becomes an example of
strategic acts of repair through which the long history of inferiority of Iranians citizens, within and
without their country, gets bluntly exposed and challenged. In addition, the production, through
its redressive modes, encourages its spectators to de-initiate themselves from the constant state of
fear only to get empowered to imagine a different and maybe a brighter future for their country.
However, as Alizad rightly puts it, “optimism for future should be caused by and contextualized
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“She’s Red & Black, Circling Round, I Jumped So Hard, I
Died, There, She Was”i
Figure 4.1: SET Experimental Art Event, Photographer Unknown, Published on Facebook on May 1, 2016.
“Media represents us [Iranian musicians] as either runaway rock stars or oppressed rap singers.
There are so many things in between that we can be, so, why are we deprived of them?”1 Asserted
Siavash Amini, an electronic musician and a member/organizer of SET Experimental Art Events
iThis is the title of Nima Pourkarimi’s track, released on October 26, 2016 on SoundCloud. For listening his track
please visit https://soundcloud.com/umchunga
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in Tehran, who through his music, has been protesting the stereotypes associated with Iranians.ii
Surprisingly so, Amini is not alone; an ever-growing list of musicians, chief notable among them
Nima Pourkarimiiii (aka Umchunga), Atta Ebtekariv (aka Sote), Hesam Ohadiv (aka Idelfon), and
Shahin Entezamivi (aka Tegh), share and pursue such an objective of reconfiguring the image of
Iranian identity through sonic space too.
Considering music as a multimodal discourse for thinking about race, identity, and nationality,
within the contexts of cultural hegemony and market demands, is not a radically new idea. How-
ever, exploring dissident Iranian music as a site capable of examining Iran’s critical positionality
in the nexus of West/East (or West and the restvii), can lead into interesting and somewhat para-
doxical discussions. The electronic music movement in Iran has built an inclusive platform where
musicians with different backgrounds and nationalities are welcomed to experiment and contribute
to the growth and progress of the community. With doing so, this movement has turned music into
a mobile space where cultural encounter can occur; a neutral sonic space where the biased percep-
tions and assumptions towards one’s cultural belonging and political history, can supposedly be
surmounted or at least not foregrounded. Such sonic space, at its core, attempts to bring together
artists from different ethnicities and nationalities only to (re)form and probe the presupposed ideas
imposed on one’s cultural identity. As Josh Kun, in Audiotopia, Music, Race, and America, argues,
music can be considered as an audiotopia where “[it] functions like a possible utopia for the lis-
tener, that music is experienced not only as sound that goes into our ears and vibrates through our
iiBased on their website, SET Experimental Art Events “is an artist run festival founded in 2015 with a specific
focus on experimental music and audio-visual performances. Its main event is the yearly SetFest which incorporates
lectures, workshops and performances. Additionally SET organizes smaller events throughout the year. The festi-
val’s main emphasis is on certain styles of audio visual acts which cannot be contained by the regular boundaries of
mainstream music and art.” For Further reading please visit http://setfest.org/about/
iiiFor listening to Nima Pourkarimi (aka Umchunga) music and reading about his works visit https://www.
facebook.com/Umchunga/ and https://soundcloud.com/umchunga
ivFor listening to Atta Ebtekar (aka Sote) music and reading about his works visit https://www.facebook.com/
ata.sote.ebtekar/
vFor listening to Hesam Ohadi (aka Idelfon) music and reading about his works visit https://soundcloud.
com/idlefon
viFor listening to Shahin Entezami (aka Tegh) music and reading about his works visit https://soundcloud.
com/tegh
viiBavand Behpoor, in “No Belief, No Homeland,” concisely notes, “It seems as we can no longer talk of the East
and the West, but the West and the rest. For further visit http://www.behpoor.com/?p=773#more-773.
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bones but as a space that we can enter into, encounter, move around in, inhabit, be safe in, learn
from.”2
The inclusivity of this movement is a strategic shift towards resisting an Iranian mainstream
culture which according to Amini, the de facto spokesperson of the movement, “rejects what-
ever that challenges its norms.”3 The mainstream culture, with a strong gravitation towards pop
and folklore music,viii excludes all other styles that stand outside its perception of desirable/mar-
ketable/permissible musical product. Such selectivity of the mainstream market pushes the alter-
native musicians to either assimilate into the existing system or to isolate themselves further by
finding alternative/unofficial ways for producing and distributing their works. Within such a sys-
tem, the institutionalized cultural strategies are applied to identify those eligible for inclusion and
those condemned living at the margins. The power structure pursues this radical bifurcation as
a regulatory means through which, without applying any direct excessive force, the standards of
good citizenship, and by extension, the right of accessibility is implicated, practiced, and reified.
Thus, by probing the dominance of music styles such as folklore and pop, distributed widely by
official and domestic labels, this chapter asks how does the electronic music movement resists
the assimilatory pressures only to exercise different/possible modes of expression, recognition,
citizenship and senses of belonging? I argue these artists, by building a dynamic and inclusive
community, turn their music into a means by which individual as well as collective identities can
be imagined from different perspectives. Therefore, their music stands against the government’s
exclusion of different artistic expressions that represent ideas outside what’s considered permissi-
ble by the Islamic Ministry of Culture. Atta Ebtekar (aka Sote), an Iranian electronic musician who
recently moved back to Iran after years of living and working as a DJ in Los Angeles, believes,
“the movement’s resistance has been effective in relaxing government’s control over the music
industry.”4 The music by these electronic musicians penetrates the auditory space of the state’s
viiiAs Wendy Debano in “Singing against Silence: Celebrating Women and Music at the Fourth Jasmine Festival”
contends, “After 1997, significant policy changes occurred. For instance, certain kinds of Iranian pop music were
legalised and, within specific parameters of style, performance and lyrics, a number of local pop musicians (mainly
men) have emerged.” For further reading please refer to Music and the Play of Power in the Middle East, North Africa
and Central Asia, edited by Laudan Nooshin.
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approved music to reconfigure the boundaries and limitations of the official domain alongside of
its cultural hegemony. As Josh Kun contends, “we should be thinking of music in terms of the
differences it contains, the differences it makes audible, not the unities or harmonies it can be used
to fabricate.”5
While the nontraditional form of the electronic music movement in Iran promotes and mobi-
lizes the emancipatory hopes for reconfiguring the cultural domain, the appeal of this movement
to the Western world can become somewhat problematic. Amini, in his interview with CTM, Fes-
tival for Adventurous Music and Art, in Berlin argues,ix “Label situation in Iran is pretty awful. . .
they reject us and push us towards outside sources where, due to the international sanctions, we
must pay a lot of money to get those labels to record and market our works.”6 The distribution
of these musicians’ records by international labels within diasporic scenes, such as England, has
a twofold effect; on one hand, due to the Westernized style of the works produced within the
movement, the common idea of exoticizing oneself with the hope of higher sales and visibility
in the global market become erroneous. The exoticizing trend started mostly with Shirin Neshat
who turned cultural specific objects such as chador and Iranian calligraphy to marketable goods
within Western countries. Such a trend was applied to music where Iranian artists employed tradi-
tional instrumentations as exotic point of entry into the Western sonic space. Regarding the Iranian
electronic musicians, there is nothing authentically “Persian” about their works; these musicians
refuse to utilize traditional Iranian instruments and do not consider the sound of these instruments
a projection of themselves as (freelance) electronic musicians. On the other hand, despite their
refusal to implement marketable “Persian” features as the guarantor of immediate visibility, these
Iranian musicians continue to receive impressive international attention. It is difficult to believe
that such an outside attention/visibility is solely associated with the technical and artistic abilities
of these musicians while the tagline of their international promotion is the acknowledgment of
their imposed marginalization within Iran. For instance, the digital magazine, A Closer Listen, in
its review of Amini’s latest track release, entitled TAR, writes
ixThroughout his interview with CTM, Amini spoke in English, which is not his native language. The Iranian’s
native language is Farsi and English and Arabic is taught in schools as second and third language.
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Are we afraid because our society is afraid? Are our fears affecting others? Is this a
closed loop? Today I went to the local deli, whose television is always on, repeating
the same news every 20 minutes. A motorist had just driven into a group of people.
“It’s a terror attack!” a customer said, going table to table to emphasize his point. I
just wanted a tuna sandwich, but I felt compelled to say, “it just looks like a terrible
accident.” “No, it’s not”, he insisted, smiling, before heading into the parking lot to
tell others.7
By forcing the readers to question their source of fear, the review continues, “So here’s this album
TAR. A dark album, to be sure, but not without its points of light. Iran has had its share of upheaval
in recent years. Siavash Amini has continued to make art in the midst of chaos. In a way, even his
darkness seems like light, should one approach his music in this manner. From another angle, we
have a choice. I choose to hear the strings.”8 Thus, the value of Amini’s work is more contextual-
ized within the political climate of Iran, as a country struggling with dissension and revolt, rather
than the artist’s technical authenticity.
The politically charged attention of the international agencies to the electronic music move-
ment in Iran is not only endemic in reification of the stereotypes associated with fundamentality,
barbarity, and militarism of Iran’s clerical regime but also is an effective economical factor used by
the capitalistic market eager to sell everything at the cost of complete neutralization of the product’s
core objectives. As John Hutnyk, in Critique of Exotica, Music, Politics and the Culture Industry,
contends “Nowadays, culture is valorised as a site of struggle, where, in the accounting processes
of the public domain, the mere fact of appearance counts as a politics.”9 He then continues,
I want to carefully acknowledge that visibility does matter in a context where exclusion
from resources and opportunities is much more than an absent-minded and myopic
blindness of the dominant cultural groups, to be repaired by policy. But it is also
my argument that visibility here is only part one of a struggle, as state-sponsored
celebration of increased visibilities for hitherto ‘marginal’ groups can readily be turned
to market opportunism.10
Thus, it is imperative to think about the causality of the Western labels’ intention in investing
their resources in the music produced by marginalized and unacknowledged Iranian musicians
beyond the claims of hybridity, praises of beauty, and humanitarian missions. Is this attention
and investment bestowed as a refurbished way of reifying the First World’s supremacy within
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the “less civilized” parts of the world or is it genuinely a means for providing an inclusive and
visible platform for marginalized non-white artists on a global level? And how such a platform
can potentially disassociate itself from the (old) Orient/Occident bifurcation where the former is
constantly being (mis)used as a promotional code for the civility of the latter? As John Hutnyk
puts it, “It could be argued that this is an import of an older anthropological attitude that continues
to work within a paradigm that considers the rest of the world as the site of documentary difference
and fantasy, and has merely replicated this in conditions of transmigration.”11 Thus, the invitation
to join the “global” dialogue on the topic of electronic music can become another means to fade the
Other’s (colonized) experience of the past; a means to push the Other towards relinquishing its past
and “[forgetting] colonial violence, white supremacy and systematic exploitation and oppression
[since] hybridity saves.”12
During their 2017 panel discussion in Berlin, Shadi Bigdeli Shamloo (a member of 9T An-
tiope due), Siavash Amini, and Atta Ebrekar all proposed and shared a concern of being politically
hijacked by Western outlets and labels.x The very existence of “underground” art scene in Iran,
as Amini believes, has become the most accessible means for those who seek asylum and right of
citizenship in Western countries.xi Most notable example among musicians who left Iran within
xAs Explained on their Facebook page, “The 9T Antiope duo band consists of Iranian musicians Nima Aghiani
and Sara Bigdeli Shamloo. The band formed in 2014 alongside the Migrain Sq. trio band, which also includes Pouya
Pour-Amin and has existed since 2002. Working since 2014 with this new band, their albums include “Syzygys”
(December 2015 by “Unperceived Records”), "Brobdingnagian" (July 2016 by "Flaming Pines" (UK) as part of its
"Tiny Portraits" project), their single track "Venator" featured in "Absence" compilation, (February 2016 by "Flaming
Pines", alongside a number of other Iranian Electronic/Experimental artists). They have a self-released Ep "Of Murk
and Shallow Water" which came out on January 2017, and also their latest album "Isthmus" was released on March
2017 by "Eilean Records" (France). The main focus of the band is on experimental music, using layers of acoustic
instruments, electronics and combining them with vocals and lyrics, in order to narrate tiny bits or huge landscapes of
the chaotic worlds they vision, along with their inhabitants.” For further reading please visit: www.facebook.com/
pg/9TAntiope/about/?ref=page_internal
xiShahram Khosravi, in Young and Defiant in Iran, explores the meaning and geology of the formation of under-
ground movement in Iran. As he argues, “Zi[r] zamin means both “basement” and “underground” in Persian. The
basement in Tehran is another place/space for cultural defiance. A remarkable activity in Tehran basements is rock.
There are numerous rock groups that are “both metaphorically and physically underground” (Nooshin 2005: 464).
There is also an online music magazine called Zirzamin (underground), which is a forum for the new wave of Iranian
underground musicians. Started in early 2006, Zirzamin aims to be a connection between different bands that other-
wise have no contact with each other. The editor of Zirzamin , himself a rock musician based nowadays in Sweden,
believes that there are nearly a hundred active underground bands in Tehran. 7 The number includes also other illicit
music styles such as Heavy Metal, Rap, Techno, Reggae, and Alter- native. By summer 2006, ten albums had been
distributed through underground channels. O-Hum and Kiosk have released their albums outside Iran. Others who lack
capital to give out albums inside the country or contacts in the Iranian diaspora put their music on their homepages.
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the past decade is Mohsen Namjoo, a current Artist in Residence at Brown University, who took
advantage of his trial in absentia back home to file his request for political asylum in the United
States.xii Amini then continues, “Some of the musicians who make “intellectual” music which, is
a mix of Persian instrumentations and poetry with Jazz and Rock move abroad and do one inter-
view with BBC and VOA (Voice of America), then, apply for political asylum. We are absolutely
against that.”13 The issue is more complicated than what Amini asserts as a critique to those who
seek asylum in diaspora. In such cases, and in the context of West/East dualistic relationship, those
who “produce intellectual music” and those who are like Amini, are both actually being used as
a means of reification of the hegemonic power, superiority, and civility of the Western culture.
Whether it is Iranian musicians in diaspora who mix Persian instrumentation with Western ones to
show their assimilatory desire to the host(ile) culture, or it is artists like Amini who from inside
Iran collaborate with Western poets and musicians, they all attract the same politically charged
international attention. In both cases, the flirtation with the West becomes a new mode of inclusion
for those who lack the feeling of rootedness in and belonging to their own original community.
The history of cultural evolution in Iran also plays a bold role in the younger generation
of artists’ gravitation towards the West. Before the Islamic revolution, and during the Pahlavi’s
dynasty, organizing glamorous pop concerts and art festivals was a key feature in the modernization
of the country. These events ranged from the Pahlavi regime’s extravaganza of pop concerts led by
domestic singers to inviting renowned international musicians such as John Cage to the Shiraz Art
Music styles like Pop and ethnic are more fortunate than rock. Since the late 1990s and after a wave of liberalizations
in the field of youth culture, rock musicians are still “underground.” I met Kian, one of the most celebrated bassists
among rock fans in Tehran, in a coffee shop in Tehran in August 2006. Rock cannot be overground because of its
rebellious nature. Many rock bands do not want to be overground in order to avoid compromising their music with
Ministry of Culture. Under the ground you play what your heart wants, but over the ground there are rules, basijis ,
and like this. They bully us not only for the music we play but for everything. Our hair, clothes or something else. It is
amazing to see how so many bands worked hard “underground” to create an Iranian rock, perhaps for the first time in
Iran. Kian says: We have never had rock here. What they called rock before the Revolution was a copy of bad Western
music. There were one or two exceptions like Farhad and Fereydoun Foroughi. But nothing more. Now in Tehran
basements you can hear a rock music which is Iranian. Its lyric, its tune, come from Tehran not from Los Angeles.”
Thus, underground has become a strategic means for Iranian musicians to mark their invisibility/inaudibility.
xii“Yarom Bia” is an example of Namjoo’s work, a music video that he produced through collaborating by a well
known underground rock band Kiosk. For viewing the music video please visit: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=dFRworsIhW4
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Festival.xiii By turning the country into a market for western commodities, Mohammad Reza Shah
Pahlavi, who reigned from 1941 to 1979, paralyzed the domestic businesses, eliminated the middle
class, and divided the country into lower and upper social strata. His attempts to westernize the
country was firmly supported by the then American President, Lyndon B. Johnson, who In 1964
said “What is going on in Iran, is about the best thing going on anywhere in the world,”14 and his
ambassador to Tehran chimed in “The Shah (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) is making Iran (a)
showcase of modernization in this part of the world.””15 Due to a such fast modernization process,
the cultural and sociopolitical discourses of the country were widely divided. As a result, various
oppositional groups including socialists, liberal-nationalists, students, elites, and clerical leaders
started to criticize the Pahlavi’s Western-biased cultural and political agendas. By referring to the
West as the ‘Other,’ these oppositional groups believed that such a westoxicated transformation was
designed to put an end to the authentic Iranian culture and its political and economic sovereignty in
the Middle East. These dissident voices accentuated the authenticity of the Middle Eastern identity
and “warned Asian intellectuals to safeguard their cultural identity, ethnic memories and heritage
in the face of the intellectuals’ assault of Western thought.”16 Though determined to bring about
changes, the various oppositional movements lacked the presence of a charismatic leader, capable
of uniting and coordinating an impactful movement. “Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, who had
previously challenged the Shah’s authority and was thus exiled to Turkey and Iraq, provided the
missing link.”17 As Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi, in Iran Political Culture in the
Islamic Republic, argue, “In a patrimonial political culture such as Iran’s, charismatic patriarchal
authorities are usually welcomed and emerge as lightning rods of socio-political mobilization.”18
By constructing a strong political culture, Khomeini united all the social classes and oppositional
voices within an Islamic movement and toppled the Pahlavi regime in 1979.
After the revolution, by dismantling the populism that had aided the clerical leaders to mo-
bilize the masses, myriad restrictions were enforced on the cultural domain of the country. These
restrictions were imposed under the justification of cleansing the country from the illicit monar-
xiiiThe Shiraz Art Festival was an annual event held in Shiraz by Pahlavi regime from 1967 to 1977 as a way of
bringing East and West together.
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chical and westoxicated influences. Within the span of few years, Iran’s cultural scene went from
hosting artists such as Cage, Robert Wilson, and Peter Brook, individuals who symbolized the
highest degree of cultivation, aesthetic taste, and intellectualism for Pahlavi monarchy, to a total
shut down where for instance any tapes of Western music had to be deconstructed and hidden in
pairs of socks to be imported into the country by individual travelers. Such radical reconfigura-
tion of the country’s cultural space, particularly within the sonic realm, became a means by which
Iranian people realized the gravity of their evolving national identity both inside and outside the
country.
In the realm of music, the total monopoly over the popular and folkloric music scene, its per-
missibility and distribution became a means of exercising power and sovereignty by the Islamic
regime. The critique of such a strong governmental grip was initially manifested in the visual art
discourse and through the works of artists such as Newsha Tavakolian and Shirin Neshat. Shirin
Neshat who was born in 1957 in Qazvin, left the country after the revolution and moved to the
United States where she started to study fine arts. In 1990 and upon her visit to Iran, Neshat was
surprised and perplexed by the radically changed and Islamicized cultural and political discourses
of the country. After witnessing the brutal restrictions imposed on Iranian women in public places,
Neshat created one of her best-known photo collections, Women of Allah (1993-97). Photograph-
ing Iranian women covered with veils and Farsi words and embellished with weapon-shaped jewel-
ries, Neshat “Challenged the perceptions of Iran’s social, cultural and religious codes by depicting
militant Muslim women in whom she infuses the idea of martyrdom.”19 After Women of Allah,
Neshat started to experiment with the medium of video installation and the issue of impermissi-
bility of women singing in public to an audience of all genders.xiv The result of her critique was
Turbulent which was a split-screen video art piece depicting male and female performers singing
one of the traditional Iranian hymns on a public stage. While the male performance is witnessed
and applauded by a crowded audience, the female singer performs in front of an empty house.
xivStill to this date, the appearance of women on public television while playing a musical instrumental or their
attendance to a public concert as a lead singer has remained a highly contested area. Judicial punishment can be
pursued if a woman sings in a public setting without acquiring a necessary permission.
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By limiting the female performance to kind of a private gig, Neshat capitalizes on the issues as-
sociated with dichotomies such as man/woman, permissible/ impermissibility, and public/private
endemic in clerical regime ideology and manifested most obviously within the contested discourse
of music.xv
Another artist is Newsha Tavakolian who also in her series titled “Listen” criticizes the im-
permissibility of displaying (female) singers.
xvAlthough Neshat’s commentary on the condition of Muslim women in Middle Eastern countries is important,
the appeal of her works within the Western mainstream culture is problematic and more aligned with the stereotyped
perception of the Muslim identity. Incorporating marketable objects such as chador and Persian calligraphy aides
Neshat to identify herself as an exotic female artist based in diaspora. Her works prove the essential outlook of the
“Occident” towards the “Orient” and at its core bears the idea of backwardness, barbarism, and traditionalism of the
Middle Eastern nations. Though the rhetoric of the black/white racial binary of the Occidental world in general and the
United States in particular is designed towards eliminating the existence of the people of color, such depiction of the
Middle Eastern culture works in favor of what Andrea Smith, in “Indigeneity, Settler Colonialism, White Supremacy,”
labels as the policy of “orientalism, which anchors war.” The logic of orientalism functions based on the idea of the
West identifying itself as the superior nation to the exotic and inferior Oriental people. Logic of this pillar, Smith
believes, is the United States’ desire for war with colored immigrants, most notably Iranians and Arabs, identified as
strong enough nations to pose a serious threat to them. As Sherene H. Razack argues “Regarded as inherently fanatical
and prone to violence, the figure of the Muslim/Arab shows that the strictly biological basis of race is accompanied
by the notion that “the truth of race lies in the terrain of innate characteristics of which skin color and other physical
attributes provide only the most obvious, and in some respect the lost superficial indicators.” Thus, while Neshat
depicts and problematizes the violence imposed on Muslim women in the Middle Eastern countries, she reifies the
biased post 9/11 racial ideology of the Occidental world towards Islam. Such commentary within the field of visual
art on the topic of Islamic domination over the practice of music is not new. For further reading on Andrea Smith and
Razack’s arguments please refer to Racial Formation in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Daniel Martinez Hosang.
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Figure 4.2: Newsha Tavakolian, Maral Afsharian from the series “Listen,” 2010; Pigment print photograph, 23 5/8 x
31 1/2 in.; Courtesy of the artist and East Wing Contemporary Gallery, Photo downloaded from the National Muesum
of Women in the Arts, “She Who Tells a Story” Exhibition.
As Tavakolian contends,
The project ‘Listen’ focuses on women singers who are not allowed to perform solo or
produce their own CDs due to Islamic regulations in effect since the 1979 revolution.
The photos are taken of the professional women singers performing in their mind in
front of a large audience, where in reality this was taking place in a small private studio
in downtown Tehran. Subsequently, in my mind I made a dream CD cover for each of
the women, which was my own interpretation of the society I live in and experience.
However, the CD cases will for now remain empty.20
Jasmin, a music festival organized exclusively for female musicians and audiences, was the direct
outcome of the rising domestic and international pressure on the regime’s total clamped down on
the country’s sonic space. As Wendy S. DeBano, in “Singing against Silence: Celebrating Women
and Music at the Fourth Jasmine Festival,” describes
The Jasmine Festival (Jashnvāreh-ye Gol-e Yās) is a weeklong festival of women’s
music that began in 1999, one of the first national festivals of women’s music in Iran.
The festival, which features art and folk musics, is held annually at one of Tehran’s
most prestigious concert halls, the Tālār-e Vahdat, and is timed to coincide with the
birthday of Fatemeh, the daughter of the Prophet Mohammad and wife of the first
Shi’eh Imam, Ali. Open only to female performers and audiences, this event is a
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unique occasion on which women, performing for and with other women, work to
negotiate complex government policies and changing social views regarding women,
music and performance.21
While within the context of these artworks, music was depicted as a contested area with lim-
ited, and sometimes mutated, visibility for its agents, alternative rock, pop, and metal movements
started to form an underground space, offering audibility at the cost of no visibility and thus revers-
ing the resistance process. Absence from the public realm bestowed a critical performativity and
political audibility to these movements necessary to challenge the regime’s domination over the
sonic space. The result of the subversive presence of the underground space was to issue permissi-
bility for the pop music during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, a reformist Shia theologian
who was elected in 1997 as the fifth president of Iran. As the former Minister of Culture and
Islamic Guidance, Khatami was a cleric known for his tolerance, opposition to censorship, and
modern outlook towards Islam. During his campaign, by prioritizing issues such as ““political de-
velopment,” “civil society” and “rule of law,” Khatami glorified the role that students, youth, and
women play in the future development of the nation.”22 Khatami aptly realized that ignoring the
“third generation” and their needs would be a big mistake in reconfiguring the cultural and political
discourses of the country.xvi Particularly with the rising rate of literacy in Iran from “49 percent
in 1980 to about 70 percent in 1995,”23 and the rising number of students to over 19 million in
1997, continuing the same old policies would become very costly for the newly elected reformist
administration.24 Khatami’s moderate, optimistic, and “democratic” Islamic ideology assisted him
to win the votes of a large body of young voters who were fed up with the state’s restrictions.
xviShahram Khosravi, in Young and Defiant in Tehran, provides a genealogy of Iranian generation by contending,
The First Generation made the Revolution. At the time of the Revolution they were in their twenties and older. They
had spent their youth under the Shah’s rule and had experience of pre-Revolutionary Iran. In the 1970s, thanks to
the oil boom, they witnessed a relatively expansive economy and Westernizing urban life. They lived their youth in
an Iran that was connected to the global village and aimed to be one of the most modern countries in the world. But
what unites them as a generation is, perhaps, their experience of the Revolution. The Second Generation (to which I
belong) was in its early teens at the time of the Revolution, born between 1965 and 1970. It has vague memories of the
time prior to the Revolution. What unites them as a generation is spending their formative years during the eight-year
war with Iraq between 1980 and 1988. This generation makes up a large part of the expatriates who left Iran in the
1980s. The Third Generation, who have just come of age, make up more than half the present population and have
no memory of the Revolution. Unlike the First and Second Generations, the Third Generation has been totally formed
under the rule of the Islamic regime. In their own words: “We are the product of the Islamic Republic.” For further
reading please refer to his book page 5.
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Capturing seventy percent of the votes, Khatami’s landslide victory was a firm response to the
hardliners who had dominated the country for almost a decade. Following the election, the re-
formist press labelled the day of Khatami’s victory as the epic of 2 Khordad (23rd of May). Later,
the 23rd of May “was chosen by coalition of Khatami’s supporter as their designation.”25 How-
ever, in response to the reformists’ victory, hardliners were able to hold onto enough power to stop
Khatami’s cabinet from re-channeling a political euphuism formed during the election towards
building a more democratic society. Khatami’s administration, however, was able to open up the
space for cultural activity, specifically in the field of performance and sonic art. “One of the most
remarkable changes”26 Laudan Nooshin argues “was the legalisation of pop music – which had
been banned in public since the 1979 Revolution – and the subsequent development of a local pop
music industry.”27 She then continues,
Not only did this legalisation allow the government to take control of the pop music
market, but many Iranians welcomed what came to be known as ‘pop-e jadid’ (‘the
new pop’) as an alternative to imported diaspora pop which had dominated the black
market since the early 1980s and was increasingly regarded as disconnected from life
in Iran.28
During Khatami’s era, the youth culture introduced itself as one of the most prominent el-
ements within the country’s newly reconfigured socio-cultural domain. Increased access to the
Internet and satellite technology in the 1990s promoted the currency of global culture and Western-
based ideologies among the youth in Iran. The dial up Internet and its capability in sharing music
(through piracy, mp3 files, and later USB flash drives) revolutionized the accessibility of interna-
tional music inside the country. As Siavash Amini contends “With the advent of dialed-up Internet,
people would go to each other’s houses and trade their collection with one another. We couldn’t
and still can’t buy anything directly, so we have to rely on free downloads, or people who travel
internationally and are able to bring music back with themselves."29 Parallel to the radical refor-
mation of the cultural discourse, venues such as cafés and galleries became among the most pivotal
spaces where the limits of the Islamic freedom/democracy were put into examination. The legal-
ization of pop music brought with it an emancipatory hope for marginalized groups to challenge the
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relationship between the center and peripheries within the contested discourse of music. However,
as the alternative groups such as rock, metal, indie rock and electronic music were about gaining
momentum to claim their right of visibility and inclusion, the presidency of Khatami ended with
the election of the fundamentalist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, who became the sixth president
of the Islamic Republic for the subsequent eight years.
Ahmadinejad’s first term of presidency ended with a massive wave of criticism domestically
and internationally. Despite all the criticisms, Ahmadinejad was re-elected in 2009 through a
disputed election resulting in chaos and uprisings across the country. After reversing Khatami’s
reformative policies, Ahmadinejad aimed and masterminded eight years of strict control and cen-
sorship on sociopolitical and cultural discourses of the country. “The preceding eight years of
reform had had long-term implications for music in Iran and the election was followed by a period
of uncertainty among musicians.”30 Such uncertainty pushed musicians further to the margins as
well as underground (zir zamin) spaces where performing music did not require permit from the
Islamic Cultural Ministry.
After few years of staying underground, the electronic music movement, with the hope of
attainting more publicity, organized its first round of SET Experimental Art Event, an artist run
music festival in Tehran with a main focus on electronic music, in 2015, where not only musicians
but visual and media artists gathered to realize a holistic audio-visual concert. The first SET Fest
was organized purely on what is called “DIY” (Do It Yourself) culture, as none of the musicians
including Amini, Pourkarimi, Ebtekar, Ohadi, and Entezami had any experience of transforming
a venue designed for a pop concert into a heavily technological audio-visual electronic event.
However, the SET Fest proved to be a success for the movement as Ebtekar contends,
Digital media, mix media, and electronic scene are growing rapidly in Iran. . . we are
trying to collaborate with other communities instead of competing with them; we share
venues, software, experience and expertise with each other only to help each other to
grow. In terms of audience, people with different musical tastes were in attendance
and that is the reason why this movement is maturing organically.31
The second SET Fest happened in 2017 where a wider group of artists from different back-
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Figure 4.3: Audiences at the last day of the SET Fest in Tehran, Iran. Photographer Unknown, published on Facebook
on June 6, 2015.
grounds, ethnicities, and nationalities showcased their works. However, due to the restriction over
the foreigners traveling to Iran, the SET Fest experienced a setback, one that the SET organizers
hope to be resolved by the end of Trump Presidency. Amini believes, “The travel ban for us is
a sign of a very bigger and scary thing.”32 He continued, “Not that it won’t affect us as people
or artists, but it puts the lives of many people from Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and other places in seri-
ous limbo—and, in many cases, in direct danger.”33 In terms of the Tehran experimental music
scene—specifically the SET festival—the effects of the new administration had immediate conse-
quences. A handful of international artists who had previously attended the events “seem unlikely
to choose to do so as having a previous Iranian visa on your passport could lead to difficulties
getting into the United States.”34 Thus, while the electronic music movement is keen to center
its international appeal on its purely technical and radically new style, it is undeniable that the
political climate surrounding Iran’s relationship with the United States, alongside its allies in the
Middle East, is the foremost factor in the acknowledgment of this movement on a global level.
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Without a doubt, individuals such as Amini, Ebrekar, and Pourkarimi and events such as SET Fest
have played a bold role in the re-articulation of the governmental rules and regulation over the
music industry within the past few years. However, it would be to the benefit of Iranian domes-
tic music industry if this movement starts to distance itself from the hybridity and humanitarian
claims of the foreign labels and acknowledge the consequence of its international appeal in a more
comprehensive and informed manner.
Core members and organizer of SET Fest: A Guide
Siavash Amini
Known As the de facto spokesperson of the Iranian electronic music movement, Amini was born
in 1987 in Tehran where he spent most of his childhood listening to traditional and folk Iranian
music. His interest in music intensified when he was exposed to the Western black metal, jazz, and
rock, dissident and subversive sonic movements formed as a reaction to the hegemonic and highly
regulated cultural events in the West. Amini, in his interview with Hearfeel website remembers,
“As I became older, I got into jazz and then certain contemporary composers through a friend who
had a huge collection of ECM Records which I devoured. At the same time, I was listening to
black metal and other extreme metal genres.”35 He then continued “It was in my last year of high
school that I got into Massive Attack and it opened up a whole new world for me; I started digging
more and more into the electronic music world and the search still continues.”36
The rise of Amini in the international scene is due to the release of albums such as Subsiding in
2016, and TAR in 2017. TAR, the most successful release by Amini, has been praised by numerous
international critiques; for example, Hollow Ground, one of the most important virtual platforms
for independent musicians,xvii in its review of the album asserts,
Continuing his experiments combining elements of drone and modern classical mu-
sic, Tehran based composer Siavash Amini‘s 4th solo LP "TAR" explores the fragile
tensions between an individual and a collective subconscious. TAR is an inquiry of
xviiFor further information please refer to http://hallowground.com/about
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Figure 4.4: Siavash Amini, Photographer unknown, Published on Facebook on March 13, 2017.
how fears and hopes of an individual can be related to a broader state of mind shared
collectively. Making it‘s starting point the expression of these feelings in dreams and
nightmares of each individual, and translating the images, feelings and textures into
sound.37
Without a doubt Amini’s music is subtle, immersive, and at the forefront of the movement. By
synthesizing noise, drones, and ambient music with instruments such as violin and bass, and in
the context of strictly regulated cultural atmosphere of Iran, Amini invites the listeners to a sort
of sonic documentary presenting Iranians with an opportunity to imaging their individualities in
radically new and different ways.
99
Figure 4.5: Umchunga performs with Amir B Ash in day 3 of SET Fest, Photographer Unknown, published on
Facebook on June 8, 2015.
Nima Pourkarimi (aka Umchunga)
Umchunga is the pseudonym of Nima Pourkarimi, one of the founders and major voices of the
electronic music movement in Tehran, Iran.xviii Born in 1987, Nima, through attending public
music classes, received an extensive training in classical music and playing guitar. After being
accepted into Tehran University of Art, Department of Music, Nima started to experiment with
electronic music alongside his classmate, Siavash Amini, and friend, Hesam Ohadi. Upon dropping
out of University, Nima devoted all his time to produce electronic and noise music with release of
his debut album, Should Have Been Done by Now, in 2016 through the British label Hibernate
Records.
Should Have Been Done by Now earned the praise of international music critiques such as
James Catchpole, an expert in ambient and electronic music, who believed Nima’s music “Perched
on the tips of the trees, the vocals cry out. It is a desperate cry that contains a subtle kind of urgency,
xviiiNima picked up this name from Mira Calix’s track titled Umchunga Locks.
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but this cry is also a reassurance of the music’s destiny, and because of that it’s oddly soothing.”38
He then continues, “It waits until the time is right, and only then do the drones strike. It all starts
with a single note; a spark can cause a prairie fire.”39 In another review, Mathew Atkins compares
Should Have Been Done by Now to Pink Floyd by asserting, “with a quiet drone, but after a few
minutes there’s an unexpected twist in intensity. Droning organ sounds and effects reminiscent of
early Pink Floyd, from their most psychedelic period. But on the other side, there are also the calm
guitar themes from the title track.”40 He then confessed “I don’t know if it’s the context and being
from Tehran that gives this album an extra, and somewhat different, dimension: there’s a cry of
despair in almost every track, but there’s also hope.”41
Nima also frequently uploads his tracks on soundcloud.com, a platform that has provided
Iranian musicians a more direct contact with their listeners. One of Nima’s latest tracks is titled
She is Red & Black, Circling Round, I Jumped So Hard, I Died, There, She Was which is going
to be part of his upcoming album with no concrete release date yet. The track, which perhaps has
the most resemblance to familiar local melodies for its Iranian listeners, progresses within a very
narrow pitch range with lonely keynotes inviting to an immersive experience where numbness and
immobility is the only outcome at the end. Most of Nima’s music resembles a closed circuit where
the outside turbulent and chaotic world materializes itself in an internal wound.
Conclusion
Music can be considered as a means for investigating and displaying social concerns, particularly
for those marginalized groups who find no official outlets to exercise and express their collective
and individual identities. The music produced by the marginalized Iranian musicians is then a way
of building personal narratives about a hegemonic power that insists on excluding those standing
outside its defined normalcy. The importance of the electronic music movement inside Iran is in
its ability to circumvent official censorship by eliminating lyrics from their music. The music they
produce is semiotically vague as it undercuts the power of language in producing robust statements.
By tapping into the individual and collective experiences of its listeners, this music brings with
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it a bundle of nuanced emotions impossible to be articulated within linguistic texts. As one of
the organizers of the SET Fest argues “One thing I think is important to remember is that these
performances were not raves at all. No part of any performance resembled a party. Everyone sat
in the dark, moving discreetly with the music and most people listened quite seriously. It was kind
of a brain rave.”42 It is exactly due to the positionality of this music, its counterhegemonic stance,
and the anxiety surrounding its distribution that such level of performativity becomes possible. Ash
Koosha, an exiled Iranian musician in London, accentuates the same issue by drawing comparison
between Iran and London and concluded that,
The main difference is that [in London], a musical event is a casual event. You listen
to music, enjoy the arts and have fun. In Iran, it’s not a casual event. It’s well-prepared
(if it’s legal, and most Western music is illegal in Iran). So, there’s a huge element of
stress. A lot of adrenalin is involved regardless of whether you’re a performer or an
audience member. At any moment, you could be arrested. It’s an intense state of mind;
you’re always on edge. You think ’what I’m doing is so big and so important. I could
be arrested but I’m still here.’ The idea of having fun and having a couple of beers at
a gig in Dalston really isn’t the case in Iran. It’s quite the opposite - it’s a really big
deal."43
Thus, music needs to be fully contextualized in its sociopolitical and cultural discourse as well
as its dynamic cycle of production, distribution, and reception in order to become performative.
However, such attempts often have ended up in romanticizing the marginalized music as inher-
ently subversive and authentic at global level. Domestically, the electronic music is counted as an
innovative form, actively challenging the long-held shared values of an authentic Iranian musical
style. While this movement interrupts the flow of mainstream folk and pop culture by interjecting
noise synthesis into its rhetoric, it also challenges the underground rock movement that has heavily
relied on linguistic text to get a message across.xix Globally, the authenticity of this music is an
imposed and external value based solely upon the nationality of the musicians. This is an intersec-
tion where one should ask the tough question regarding the performativity of this movement on its
xixDouglas Kahn, in Noise, Water, Meat, define noise as “the forest of everything. The existence of noise implies a
mutable world through an unruly intrusion of an other, an other that attracts difference, heterogeneity, and productive
confusion; moreover, it implies a genesis of mutability itself. Noise is a world where anything can happen, including
and especially itself. In a predictable world noise promises something out of the ordinary, and in a world in frantic
pursuit of the extraordinary noise can promise the banal and quotidian.”
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global level. While such a movement “feeds on and borrows from its cultural and social milieu,
taking aspects of the publicity-dominated consumerism which surrounds it and subverting them
for its own dissident purposes,”44 as Ian Biddle and Venessa Knights in Music, National Identity
and the Politics of Location, argues, “it is perfectly possible to see the opposite process taking
place, arguing that capitalism always and everywhere succeeds in taking control of social and cul-
tural movements that emerge within it, however initially subversive their ideology, defusing them
and perverting them to serve its own purposes.”45 Anywhere on this spectrum, music is capable
of facilitating a platform to imagine and think through different modes of identification. As mu-
sicians of electronic movement in Iran believe, one should not be molded into the stereotypes of
either oppressed rap singers or runaway rock stars. However, as this chapter demonstrates, even
if these musicians see themselves somewhere in-between these stereotypes, the dimension of this
in-betweenness space should be drawn in relation to each end, otherwise it becomes a vacuum
entity incapable of producing a meaningful change.
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Em-Bracing the Liminal rather than Nostalgia
I had the visceral experience of leaving my country, not thinking of myself as a brown person
until I arrived at the Minneapolis airport security check where I was treated as a “colored” Muslim
immigrant from the Middle East.i The next eight years was an effort to process this transformation;
how through passing three borders, from Iran to Frankfurt and from Frankfurt to Minneapolis, my
whole perception and personal identification was forced to change. In the United States, while I
learned to see myself as an individual not white enough to escape the race-based discrimination on
its grand-level, I realized I am often read as “too white” to have the privilege of being categorized as
a minority on a legal level. Racial loophole such as these became the reality of my new American
life where daily news, any terrorist attacks around the world, the slightest geopolitical shift in the
Middle East, and U.S. foreign policy would simply add another dimension to it.
Without considering the challenges of overcoming the racial hierarchy, reified and reinforced
based upon legal top-down and everyday bottom-up policies, I labeled Iranian immigrants who in-
troduce themselves as “Persians” deceivers; Iranians who desperately attempt to get the American
public into believing that “Persians” are better than “Iranians,” or “Persians” are a more civilized
version of “Iranians.” Interestingly enough, many of these “Persian” immigrants resided in Los
Angeles, their paradisiacal destination, refering to it as Tehrangeles like the city is theirs or can be
theirs exclusively. This population often appears as a delusional tribe to me; a tribe that creates its
own alternative Persia in America’s “melting pot.”
Gradually as I witnessed Iranians being pinpointed for all the wrongdoings around the world,
including the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks, the never-ending Iraq and Afghanistan military occupa-
iWhile living in Iran, I was never forced into seeing myself as a person of color or specific race.
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tions, the formation of radical terrorist groups such as ISIS, the Syrian refugee crisis, the Yemeni
catastrophe, and the Israel and Palestine’s pointless ongoing “peace” conversation, I started to
think perhaps misrepresenting one’s identity is not the worst idea when truth is completely substi-
tuted with its simulacrum on such a national scale; a simulacrum that is promulgated and preached
into the Americans’ ears through mainstream cultural venues such as National TV and radio. By
broadcasting the U.S.’s involvement against foreign threats, particularly those from the Middle
East, people from that region are antagonized and stigmatized on a daily basis. It is through this
continuous depiction of the abjection associated with brown bodies that the American identity is
built “in relation to its "outside"—in terms of international power-relations—and in relation to its
"inside"— the diverse and hierarchical construction of identities within the national borders.”1
As an immigrant of color, one of the most interesting examples of being depicted as the
“Other” was the case of Iran and its demotion from U.S.’s most important Middle Eastern ally to
its most dangerous and hostile foe. The 1978-79 Islamic Revolution, the invasion of the Ameri-
can Embassy, and the hostage crisis of the 1979 became the signposts of this new Iran. On the
November 4th of 1979, images of the Basij (Iran’s military force) invading the American embassy
in Tehran, while taking sixty-five American diplomats hostage, became the new hot breaking news
on every single channel. The whole story was broadcast every night on ABC’s Nightline program
titled “America Held Hostage.”ii The rhetoric of most of the American programs, including that of
ABC’s, heavily capitalized on the depiction of Iranians as the enemy of the United States and as a
danger to its allies in the region. Witnessing these programs and as a reactionary and more likely
a survival move, Iranians based in the U.S. started to counter such abject depictions by injecting
themselves into the mainstream culture and articulating their desire of assimilation into the soci-
ety. As Hamid Naficy, in The Making of Exile Cultures, Iranian Television in Los Angeles, argues
“exile is a process of perpetual becoming, involving separation from home, a period of liminality
and in-betweenness that can be temporary or permanent, and incorporation into the dominant host
society that can be partial or complete.”2
iiPlease refer to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUeo36Vzkb8 for watching one of the episode of
“American Held Hostage.”
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The most notable outcome of decades of assimilatory efforts made by Iranian émigrés based
in the United States is probably The Bravo TV reality show, Shahs of Sunset.iii Following the lives
of six Iranian-Americans in Beverly Hills, California, Shahs of Sunset depicts “Persians” as those
constantly attempting to introduce themselves outside of their connections and attachments to Iran
and its clerical regime. Showcasing such intent, the subtext of the Shahs of Sunset is thus heavily
based on capitalizing and promoting the inclusive nature of (capitalistic and consumeristic) culture
of the United States.
Figure 5.1: Shahs of Sunset, Bravo TV, program poster.
Every now and then one of the characters of the show utters a few words in Farsi with a thick
American accent in order to highlight the welcoming attitude of the American cultural hegemony
towards the exotic trends of a widely stigmatized group. However, for me, the simulacrum of
inclusion promulgated by the Shahs of Sunset becomes fully exposed when it is juxtaposed against
the normative ways of depicting Iranian culture within the American media. For instance, parallel
to the success of The Salesman, an Iranian movie directed by Asghar Farhadi and the winner of
the best screenplay and the best leading actor in the 2016 Cannes Film Festival and 2017 Academy
iiiShahs of Sunset first premiered on March 11, 2012.
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Award winner for the best foreign Film, The New York Times, on June 1st 2017, published an article
about the arm tattoo of Taraneh Alidoosti, the lead female actress of The Salesman, as a source of
great controversy in her country.
Figure 5.2: Screenshot from The New York Times article posted on Face Book on June 1st, 2016.
As another example of depicting Iranians as backward and fundamental, on May 22nd 2016,
during the closing ceremony of the Cannes Film Festival honoring Farhadi’s The Salesman, NBC’s
Today show reported that the Islamic Republic government of Iran was masterminding a plot to
ban Iranian Instagram users from accessing Kim Kardashian’s account due to her erotic and in-
appropriate content. By capitalizing on the backwardness and barbarity of the Islamic regime,
the American media trivialized the success of an Iranian film whose international recognition is
definitely entangled with its state approved presence in such spaces.iv So, while the mainstream
culture in the United States bestows the stigmatized communities few opportunities to experience
“the moment of hegemony,” it uses the very same opportunities to reify and dictate its superiority.
ivThe Islamic regime support for the Salesman was also a response to the first executive order on the travel ban
signed by the newly elected Donald Trump as the president of the United States.
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Following all these observations, as an Iranian scholar living in the United States, I wrote this
dissertation trying to find a gap between such an essentialist and highly problematic representation
of my identity. I started with Shadi Ghadirian’s Like EveryDay photo collection where I ques-
tioned a common resentment and stereotypical depictions of the role of the hijab and chador in the
Western World. By challenging western perspectives of the chador as a sign of backwardness, I
directed my analysis to acknowledge it as a different form of a feminist and liberatory standpoint
for Muslim women. Further, I criticized artists, most notably Shirin Neshat, who uses the chador
as a marketable object for exoticizing and enhancing the visibility of their artworks in diasporic
spaces. In order to provide such a two-fold argument, I have to acknowledge my positionality to-
ward chador/hijab and the Islamic theology in general. Growing up in a household where obeying
the “Islamic” dress code was never compulsory, I was exposed to and acquainted with a moderate
version of Muslimhood. While I was learning how to read Quran, I was free to listen to and enjoy
Western music. And while I was taught about the Islamic and Iranian moral behavioral codes, I was
encouraged to develop a very active social life and to pursue my interest in art and performance. I
never considered Islam as an inherently backward lifestyle and never saw myself as an oppressed
Muslim woman due to my moderate religious tendencies. I was taught to think of religion as a
separate entity from its different interpretations by hegemonic powers. However, upon moving to
the United States, I learned that I would always be categorized as a brown, Muslim woman from
the Middle East who should consider herself lucky not to be forced into an arranged marriage or
to be stoned to death because of her progressive view of the Islamic theology. Shadi Ghadirian’s
photo analysis was a journey through this process of becoming more vocal about the problems
associated with stereotyping my Iranian identity. I wanted to demonstrate that being a feminist
has different forms and some of it happens to look radically different to those well-known Western
versions.
Writing about Endless Monologue was a necessity for me, an act of survival, somewhat a duty.
Working for four years with Alizad, as the photographer of his 84Theatre Company, provided me
with an opportunity to know one of the performance’s interviewees, Hamid, whom I defined in
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the first chapter, as “a homosexual doctoral student fluent in seven foreign languages.” Seeing his
struggle and his suffering was not easy, however, accepting that he was used like a toy by the
West for pushing its anti-Iran/Islamic agenda was even more frustrating. Witnessing his daily
struggle, alongside of many others like him, being misused by domestic and foreign governmental
agencies in furthering their biased political and administrative agendas, was soul wrenching. So,
I responded with writing about and documenting Endless Monologue where I questioned not only
Iran’s domestic policies toward its own LGBTQ community but also the United States’ biased
anti-Islamic agenda.
Mountain Language directly spoke to and addressed the overwhelming feeling of living in a
racial loophole and in-between identities. With Mountain Language, I stood in the gap, alongside
of Alizad, as we both looked at the oppressed bodies falling and breaking under the state sponsored
practices of torture. While I was aware of the problems associated with questioning the political
violence imposed on Muslims through a work of a white playwright such as Pinter, I kept asking
myself if not Pinter then who? If not Beckett, then who? And if not Crimp or Sarah Kane, then
who? While their whiteness and Otherness assist(ed) Alizad in circumventing the high level of
censorship imposed by the country’s Cultural Ministry, turning these playwrights into critiques of
the Western-based racial policy was a statement by itself. I do believe that during difficult moments
such as the current time, making choices should be more about creating deliberate paradoxes rather
than igniting a revolution as the former fosters performative conversation while the latter only costs
lives of its advocates.
Chapter 3, “She’s Red & Black, Circling Round, I Jumped So Hard, I Died, There, She Was,”
was in part a criticism of my generation. As a reaction to the Islamic regime, many of us became
obsessed with a whitewashed Western culture where the core values of Islamic and Iranian culture
would be looked at as a sign of backwardness and naivety. As an artist who collaborated with one
of the musicians of this movement, Nima Pourkarimi (aka Umchunga), for staging a performance
piece on the stage of Department of Theatre and Film at the Tehran University of Art, I had to
distance myself from the nostalgia only to be able to sit in the gap and write about the problems of
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this movement. I admire these artists for their creativity and braveness; however, I wish they could
see the other side to understand their “Otherness” from the point of view of their foreign labels and
producers.
While I wrote this dissertation to analyze the performativity of artworks produced mostly
by artists based in Iran, I do believe it is imperative for future research to consider artists who
live and work in diasporic spaces that are trying to rearticulate the American (vertical) color line
of white/non-white. Questions such as, how diasporic artists are (re)defining and (re)negotiating
the limits of whiteness? could lead the future research towards an intelligent reconfiguration of
the positionality of brown bodies. It also would be helpful to define how much assimilation is
“too much” and how much of resistance against mainstream culture is erroneous and moronic. I
have encountered scholars who used to listen to Radiohead and organize Rave parties in Iran and
upon migration to various diaspora, starting to wear turbans and to set up Quranic stations in the
American and Canadian universities only to show their resistance against assimilation into Western
culture as well as showing their pride in their brown(ed) identities. I do believe there is a gap in
between; as a matter of fact, there are many gaps in between. This dissertation has explored one
of these gaps and I believe via future research many of the other gaps will be located, analyzed,
and understood. As long as there exists extreme poles in the white/non-white color line, many
performative gaps can be shaped, animated, and lived within.
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